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SETTING THE STANDARD FOR PROXIMATE 
CAUSE IN THE WAKE OF BANK OF AMERICA 
CORP. V. CITY OF MIAMI* 
NICOLE SUMMERS** 
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Bank of America Corp. 
v. City of Miami has created fresh uncertainty around the 
interpretation of the Fair Housing Act. The Supreme Court held 
for the first time that there is a proximate cause requirement 
under the Fair Housing Act but expressly declined to decide the 
standard for meeting that requirement. This Article responds to 
that open question. It contextualizes Bank of America within the 
Court’s growing body of statutory proximate cause doctrine and 
uses the case as a starting point for addressing the broader 
question of how to determine the meaning of proximate cause in 
all statutory claims. 
The Article argues that the Supreme Court and lower courts must 
adopt a uniform analytical framework for determining proximate 
cause in statutory claims. The Article demonstrates that the 
Supreme Court’s failure to do so thus far has produced deep 
doctrinal incoherence, culminating in the Court’s inability to 
articulate a standard for proximate cause under the Fair Housing 
Act in Bank of America. The Article proposes that courts should 
uniformly apply the “scope of liability” framework as set forth in 
the recent Restatement (Third) of Torts. It contends that the 
scope of liability framework properly anchors proximate cause 
in the statutory scheme, ensures doctrinal determinacy, and 
prevents improper judicial legislation. 
The Article then applies this framework to arrive at the proper 
standard for proximate cause under the Fair Housing Act. 
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Through extensive legislative history analysis, the Article 
concludes that the standard for proximate cause under the Fair 
Housing Act is satisfied where the harm caused by unlawful 
discrimination results from direct effects on the housing market 
and falls within one of the three core areas of congressional 
concern underlying the Act’s enactment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bank of America Corp. 
v. City of Miami1 threw the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) into a state of 
legal uncertainty on the eve of its fiftieth anniversary.2 The Supreme 
Court held for the first time that there is a proximate cause 
requirement under the FHA but expressly declined to decide the 
standard for meeting that requirement.3 In the suit, the City of Miami 
(“the City”) alleged that Bank of America and Wells Fargo 
(collectively, “the Banks”) had engaged in racially discriminatory 
predatory lending in violation of the FHA.4 The City asserted that 
these actions caused financial harm by precipitating disproportionate 
foreclosures and blight in minority neighborhoods, which thereby 
decreased property tax revenues and increased demand for municipal 
services.5 Under the Court’s proximate cause holding, on remand the 
City will be required to show a “sufficiently close connection” 
between its financial injuries and the Banks’ unlawful discriminatory 
conduct.6 However, what specifically the City must show has not yet 
been determined. The Court refrained from “draw[ing] the precise 
boundaries of proximate cause” and remanded the case to the lower 
courts to gain “the benefit of [their] judgment” on this purely legal 
question.7 
 
 1.  137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). 
 2.  The Fair Housing Act was enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 on 
April 11, 1968, just seven days after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. See 
Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§	801–819, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89 (1968) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§	3601–3619 (2012)). Thus, April 11, 2018, marked the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Fair Housing Act. 
 3. Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1306. The Court also held that the City of Miami 
satisfied the “‘cause-of-action’ (or ‘prudential standing’) requirement.” Id. at 1303. The 
Court concluded that the city’s alleged injuries fell “‘within the zone of interests’ that the 
FHA protects,” and therefore the city had standing to sue. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1300–01. 
 5. Id. at 1301. 
 6. Id. at 1305. 
 7. Id. at 1306; see also Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 840 (1996) 
(referring to the determination of the proper standard for proximate cause as a “legal 
question”). The parties in Bank of America had already briefed the question of the proper 
standard for proximate cause and the Eleventh Circuit had already ruled on this question. 
See City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 801 F.3d 1258, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated sub 
nom. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017); City of Miami v. Bank of 
Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1282 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017); Brief for 
Petitioners at 45–58, Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (No. 15-1111); Brief of 
Respondent at 31–57, Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (No. 15-1111).  
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The Bank of America decision is best understood as part of a 
recent trend in which the Court is importing proximate cause 
requirements into statutes whose plain texts are silent on the issue.8 
Scholar Sandra Sperino coined the term “statutory proximate cause” 
to describe this development.9 Since 1983, the Supreme Court has 
declared a proximate cause requirement under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
the Securities Exchange Act, and the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), among 
other statutes.10 Although these statutes do not expressly state a 
proximate cause requirement, the Court has nevertheless determined 
that Congress implicitly intended to impose some limitation on the 
“ripples of harm” that are recoverable.11 
Despite this ample precedent, lower courts tasked with setting 
the standard for proximate cause under the FHA will be without 
meaningful guidance. The doctrine that has emerged on statutory 
proximate cause is wholly incoherent, consisting of a morass of 
unintelligible standards that future cases similar to Bank of America 
cannot possibly apply. The Court’s standards vary wildly, including 
whether the harm caused is a direct result of the unlawful conduct,12 
whether the unlawful conduct “played a part––no matter how small––
in bringing about the injury,”13 and whether there was an intervening 
cause between the unlawful conduct and the harm that was 
 
 8. See Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1199, 
1199–1200 (2013) [hereinafter Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause]. 
 9. Id. at 1200. 
 10. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132–
40 (2014) (requiring proximate cause under the Lanham Act); CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 705 (2011) (requiring proximate cause under the Federal 
Employers Liability Act); Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419–20 (2011) (requiring 
proximate cause under USERRA); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–46 
(2005) (requiring proximate cause in securities fraud claims); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 703–04 (2004) (evaluating proximate cause under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act); Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 754 (2004) (applying proximate cause 
to NEPA); Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1992) (requiring 
proximate cause under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”)); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 535–36 (1983) (requiring proximate cause under the Clayton Act). 
 11. Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1299. “A violation of the FHA may, therefore, ‘be 
expected to cause ripples of harm to flow’ far beyond the defendant’s misconduct.” Id. at 
1306 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 534); see also Sperino, Statutory 
Proximate Cause, supra note 8, at 1219. 
 12. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 137–40 (holding that the standard for proximate cause under 
the Lanham Act requires the plaintiff to show that the injury “flow[ed] directly” from the 
unlawful conduct). 
 13. CSX Transp., 564 U.S. at 705. 
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“superseding,”14 among others.15 These standards have flexible 
meanings, as what is considered “direct,” for instance, differs across 
the cases.16 Moreover, the Court has provided little to no reasoning 
for the variation within and among standards, leaving lower courts 
and commentators to speculate about the principles underlying 
them.17 
This Article uses Bank of America as a starting point to confront 
the question of how to determine the meaning of proximate cause in 
all statutory claims. It is the first piece of scholarship to confront this 
question directly and also the first to provide critical commentary on 
Bank of America through the lens of statutory proximate cause 
doctrine.18 The Article makes four key contributions. 
 
 14. Staub, 562 U.S. at 419–20 (holding that the standard for proximate cause under 
USERRA requires the plaintiff to show that the link between the unlawful conduct and 
the injury was direct and not “too remote, purely contingent, or indirect” and that any 
intervening cause was not “superseding”). 
 15. See, e.g., Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268–70 (holding that the proximate cause standard 
under RICO requires the plaintiff to show that its injuries were directly caused by the 
defendant’s conduct). 
 16. See infra Section II.B. 
 17. See infra Section II.B. 
 18. Sperino’s article, Statutory Proximate Cause, highlighted the problems associated 
with importing proximate cause into statutory causes of action. See generally Sperino, 
Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 8. She did not offer a theory for the proper way to 
determine the meaning of proximate cause in statutory claims once the court has declared 
the requirement to exist. No other scholarship has provided analysis on statutory 
proximate cause doctrine as a whole. Cf. Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the 
Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 57 (2013) (arguing that 
proximate cause doctrine in employment discrimination statutes is “fraught with 
numerous theoretical, practical, and doctrinal difficulties”). Only three articles focused on 
Bank of America have been published to date. See Jesse D.H. Snyder, How Patent Law 
Keeps the Hope of Fair Housing Alive for All, Even after Bank of America Corp. v. City of 
Miami, 21 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 107, 121–24 (2018); Jesse D.H. Snyder, No Need for 
Cities to Despair After Bank of America Corporation v. City of Miami: How Patent Law 
Can Assist in Proving Predatory Loans Directly Cause Municipal Blight Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 70 ME. L. REV. 63, 77–85 (2017) [hereinafter Snyder, No Need for Cities to 
Despair]; The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Leading Cases, 131 HARV. L. REV. 373, 380–82 
(2017). The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Leading Cases discusses the Court’s holding 
regarding proximate cause in brief detail and makes only general claims, such as “[t]he 
Court’s proximate cause holding required overturning no longstanding precedents and is 
broadly in line with recent decisions involving other statutes.” See The Supreme Court, 
2016 Term—Leading Cases, supra, at 380–83. In No Need for Cities to Despair, Snyder 
discusses the proximate cause holding but does not situate it within the statutory 
proximate cause body of case law. Snyder, No Need for Cities to Despair, supra, at 76–79. 
Snyder instead looks to patent law to inform analysis on causation between discriminatory 
predatory lending and the financial harms alleged by the City. See id. at 79–85. Snyder’s 
analysis appears to treat proximate cause as factual cause, focusing on how the City can 
factually prove the link between its harms and the defendant’s conduct. See id. As will be 
discussed in Section II.A and Section IV.B, concerns about speculation and whether the 
97 N.C. L. REV. 529 (2019) 
534 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
First, the Article situates Bank of America within the Supreme 
Court’s body of statutory proximate cause case law. The Article 
demonstrates that the proximate cause analysis in Bank of America 
both reflects and solidifies the incoherence of the Court’s doctrine. By 
characterizing the Court’s decision to remand as the culmination of 
this incoherence, the Article argues that the doctrine has become so 
unworkable that even the Court itself could not figure out how to 
properly apply it in Bank of America. 
Second, the Article systematically unpacks the doctrinal 
incoherence in statutory proximate cause case law and, in doing so, 
points toward a new, more productive focal point for doctrinal 
commentary. While scholars have extensively belabored the 
inconsistencies and weaknesses among the various formulations of 
proximate cause, this Article shifts the focus to the Court’s analytical 
frameworks to arrive at those formulations in the statutory context.19 
The Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court has adopted a host 
of different frameworks to determine the meaning of proximate cause 
in statutory claims. Surveying the Court’s entire body of case law on 
statutory proximate cause, the Article synthesizes the analytical 
frameworks the Court has employed into three categories: (1) 
common law, (2) public policy, and (3) legislative intent. The Article 
then shows how the Court’s fluctuation among these three 
frameworks is the source of the incoherence in statutory proximate 
cause doctrine. 
Third, the Article proposes a structured framework for 
proximate cause analysis in all statutory claims. Specifically, the 
Article argues that courts should adopt the “scope of liability” 
framework, as set forth in the recent Restatement (Third) of Torts, to 
determine the meaning of proximate cause in a given statutory 
 
plaintiff can factually establish a link between the harm alleged and the unlawful conduct 
fall within the realm of factual cause, not proximate cause. See infra Sections II.B, IV.B. 
 19. See, e.g., Jessie Allen, The Persistence of Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine 
Thrives on Skepticism, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 86–88 (2012); Terry Christlieb, Why 
Superseding Cause Analysis Should Be Abandoned, 72 TEX. L. REV. 161, 186 (1993); Peter 
C. Haley, Paradigms of Proximate Cause, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 147, 147–48 (2000); Patrick 
J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 
69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 104–05 (1991); James Angell McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 
HARV. L. REV. 149, 197–99 (1925); Daniel Joseph Shapiro, Holmes v. Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation: Proximate Cause Dims the Bright-Lines of RICO Standing, 53 LA. 
L. REV. 1911, 1933–34 (1993); Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of 
Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 1005–09 (2001) [hereinafter Stapleton, 
Legal Cause]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1275 (2009); see also infra Section II.A. 
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context.20 Under the scope of liability framework, courts would 
identify the class of harms (termed the scope of the risks) that the 
statutory prohibitions were intended to address.21 The standard that 
results is based on the outcome of this analysis: proximate cause is 
satisfied where the harm resulting from the unlawful conduct falls 
within the scope of risk of the statute.22 The Article argues that the 
scope of liability framework is the optimal framework for proximate 
cause analysis in statutory claims because (1) it strengthens doctrinal 
determinacy by forcing courts to employ the tools of statutory 
interpretation to arrive at the standard for proximate cause, and (2) it 
protects against improper judicial legislation by ensuring that the 
standard for proximate cause aligns with the statutory scheme. 
Fourth, the Article applies the scope of liability framework to 
determine the standard for proximate cause under the FHA. Through 
extensive legislative history analysis, the Article identifies the scope 
of the risks of the FHA. It demonstrates that the FHA was enacted to 
protect against three distinct categories of harms that result from 
discrimination in the housing market: (1) individualized psychological 
and economic harms, (2) the social and financial ruin of cities caused 
by ghettoization,23 and (3) entrenched residential segregation. Based 
on this analysis, the Article contends that the standard for proximate 
cause under the FHA is satisfied where unlawful discrimination 
causes harm within these categories through direct effects on the 
housing market. 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes Bank of 
America and the Supreme Court’s holding regarding proximate cause 
under the FHA. Part II traces the conceptual evolution of proximate 
cause doctrine in tort law and its recent application in statutory causes 
of action, presenting and unpacking the widespread incoherence in 
the Supreme Court’s various standards for proximate cause in 
statutory claims. Part III demonstrates that this incoherence is a 
function of the Court’s inability to settle on a consistent analytical 
 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§	29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 21. See id. §	29 cmt. d. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Racially isolated urban slums are often referred to as “ghettos” in the 
congressional debates and hearings on the FHA. Senator Joseph Tydings defined “ghetto” 
during the FHA debates as “restricted areas in which all members of a minority group are 
forced to reside no matter where they desire or can afford to live.” 113 CONG. REC. 22,848 
(1967) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings). This is typically how the term was used. See 
infra Section V.B. In this Article, the term is intended solely to give accurate meaning to 
the content of the legislative history; it is not meant to condone the language. 
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framework to determine the meaning of proximate cause in statutory 
claims. It synthesizes the analytical frameworks the Court has applied 
into three categories: common law, public policy, and legislative 
intent. Part IV argues that a scope of liability framework is the most 
appropriate framework to determine the meaning of proximate cause 
in statutory claims. Part V applies the scope of liability framework to 
arrive at the proper standard for proximate cause under the FHA. 
I.  BANK OF AMERICA CORP. V. CITY OF MIAMI 
A. Background on Reverse Redlining and Bank of America 
The City sued Bank of America and Wells Fargo for engaging in 
racially discriminatory predatory lending.24 While there is no uniform 
definition of the term “predatory lending,” a definition offered by 
Professors Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy is frequently 
cited: 
[P]redatory lending [is] a syndrome of abusive loan terms or 
practices that involve one or more of the following five 
problems: (1) loans structured to result in seriously 
disproportionate net harm to borrowers, [e.g., loans that 
contain unaffordable balloon payments], (2) harmful rent 
seeking, [e.g. prepayment penalties], (3) loans involving fraud 
or deceptive practices, (4) other forms of lack of transparency 
in loans that are not actionable as fraud, and (5) loans that 
require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.25 
 
 24. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1300–01 (2017). 
 25. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2002) (footnote omitted); 
see also Ngai Pindell, The Fair Housing Act at Forty: Predatory Lending and the City as 
Plaintiff, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 169, 172 (2009). The rise 
in predatory lending in the 1990s and early 2000s was facilitated by the growth in subprime 
lending, which expanded opportunities for abusive lending practices. See Charles L. Nier 
III & Maureen R. St. Cyr, A Racial Financial Crisis: Rethinking the Theory of Reverse 
Redlining to Combat Predatory Lending Under the Fair Housing Act, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 
941, 977–78 (2011); John P. Relman, Foreclosure, Integration, and the Future of the Fair 
Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 629, 634–35 (2008) (“As the subprime market grew, the 
opportunities for abusive practices grew with it.”). Subprime financial products are 
designed to provide credit to borrowers who do not qualify for prime loans, such as people 
who have weak credit histories or high debt-to-income ratios. Nier & St. Cyr, supra, at 944. 
The subprime market expanded dramatically in the 1990s and the early 2000s. See AMAAD 
RIVERA ET AL., UNITED FOR A FAIR ECON., FORECLOSED: STATE OF THE DREAM 2008, 
at 4–5 (Christina Kasica et al. eds., 2008), http://srwolf.com/reports/StateOfDream_
01.16.08_Foreclosed.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WGU-5W78]. Experts attribute the rise in 
subprime lending during this period to a combination of factors, including deregulation, 
technological advances in automated underwriting, and the advent of securitized 
97 N.C. L. REV. 529 (2019) 
2019] THE PROXIMATE CAUSE STANDARD 537 
The FHA broadly prohibits discrimination in the housing market on 
the basis of race and other characteristics and specifically declares 
discrimination in mortgage lending unlawful.26 Despite this express 
prohibition, predatory loans were targeted at minority borrowers of 
predominantly minority communities in the late 1990s and early 
2000s.27 Through racial steering and other illegal practices, banks 
disproportionately issued high-cost loans, often with adjustable 
interest rates and other classic predatory characteristics, to minority 
borrowers as compared to similarly qualified white borrowers.28 This 
 
mortgages. Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American 
Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 632 (2010). 
 26. See 42 U.S.C. §§	3604(b), 3605(a) (2012). 
 27. See George Galster & Erin Godfrey, By Words and Deeds: Racial Steering by Real 
Estate Agents in the U.S. in 2000, 71 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 251, 251–52 (2005) (discussing 
“steering,” a tactic where real estate agents “differentially direct clients toward particular 
neighborhoods and away from others based on race or ethnicity”); Frank Lopez, Using the 
Fair Housing Act to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 73, 78 
(1999) (documenting tactics banks have used to target predatory loan products, including 
soliciting door-to-door, repeatedly calling borrowers at their homes, and encouraging 
lenders to sign documents before reading them or with key terms missing). Critics also 
often point to the structural incentives created by the mortgage lending industry as a 
major contributing factor to the patterns of discrimination in predatory lending that 
emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s. See, e.g., Alex Gano, Disparate Impact and 
Mortgage Lending: A Beginner’s Guide, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1141–48 (2017) 
(discussing how some banks paid their brokers’ commissions on subprime loans and the 
still-popular practice of “discretionary pricing”). During the 1990s, the residential 
mortgage industry moved away from a lending system based on “‘credit rationing,’ where 
interest rates and creditworthiness requirements were fixed and loanable funds rationed, 
to a system of ‘risk-based pricing,’ where lenders would offer differential loan products 
and interest rates to borrowers .	.	.	.” Id. at 1126. 
 28. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME & 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA (2000), http://www.huduser.org/
Publications/pdf/unequal_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF98-FQF5]; Raymond H. Brescia, 
Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, The Fair Housing Act and Emerging Issues in 
Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 216 (2009); 
Galster & Godfrey, supra note 27, at 251–52; Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 25, at 947–49; 
Pindell, supra note 25, at 174; see also Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glen B. 
Canner, The 2007 HMDA Data, 94 FED. RES. BULL. A107, A125, A127 (2008). Several 
studies have found a racial gap in the probability of receiving a subprime or higher interest 
rate even after controlling for underwriting criteria. See, e.g., McKinley Blackburn & Todd 
Vermilyea, A Comparison of Unexplained Racial Disparities in Bank-Level and Market-
Level Models of Mortgage Lending, 29 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 125, 136 (2006); Debbie 
Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst & Wei Li, Race, Ethnicity and Subprime Home Loan 
Pricing, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 110, 110, 117–21 (2008). But see Marsha J. Courchane, The 
Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans to Minority Borrowers: How Much of the APR 
Differential Can We Explain?, 29 J. REAL EST. RES. 399, 433 (2007) (“The empirical 
results suggest, however, that relatively little of the aggregate differences in APRs paid by 
minority and non-minority borrowers are attributable to the differential treatment of 
borrowers.”); Michael LaCour-Little, The Home Purchase Mortgage Preferences of Low- 
and Moderate-Income Households, 35 REAL EST. ECON. 265, 287 (2007) (“Borrower race 
97 N.C. L. REV. 529 (2019) 
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practice, known as “reverse redlining,” was widespread throughout 
the country.29 
Municipalities across the country sought to recoup certain losses 
that they experienced as a result of banks’ discriminatory practices by 
filing suit under the FHA.30 In 2013, the City did the same, filing 
separate complaints against the Banks for discriminatory, predatory 
lending in violation of the FHA.31 The City’s complaints charged that 
the Banks intentionally issued riskier mortgages on less favorable, 
predatory terms to African American and Latino borrowers than they 
issued to similarly situated white, non-Latino customers in violation 
of §§	3604(b) and 3605(a) of the FHA.32 The allegedly predatory 
terms “included, among others, excessively high interest rates, 
unjustified fees, teaser low-rate loans that overstated refinancing 
opportunities, [and] large prepayment penalties .	.	.	.”33 The City 
further alleged that the Banks induced defaults on loans in a 
discriminatory manner by failing to extend refinancing and loan 
modifications to minority borrowers on fair terms.34 
 
.	.	. is only positive and significant in the use of Special Program Loans and is negative and 
significant in the choice of FHA, contrary to previous results in the literature suggesting 
that minorities were more likely to choose FHA, possibly due to steering.”). 
 29. See Brescia, supra note 28, at 216. Some scholars have argued that recent practices 
of “reverse redlining” are a direct continuation of historical redlining. See, e.g., GEORGE 
LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT 
FROM IDENTITY POLITICS 27 (rev. & expanded ed. 2006). 
 30. See, e.g., County of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 3d 952, 956 
(N.D. Ill. 2015); City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1051 (C.D. 
Cal. 2014); Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847, 848 (D. Md. 
2010); City of Birmingham v. Citigroup Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 WL 8652915, at *1 
(N.D. Ala. 2009). None of these cases reached the circuit courts of appeal. District courts 
reached varied holdings on key legal issues, including standing, requirements for 
causation, and equitable tolling of the statutes of limitations under the FHA. See, e.g., 
Mayor of Balt., 677 F. Supp. 2d at 851 (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss because the 
plaintiff failed to plead a sufficient causal connection between Wells Fargo’s actions and 
the harms alleged); City of Birmingham, 2009 WL 8652915, at *5 (granting Citigroup’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of standing). But see County of Cook, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 957–67 
(denying HSBC’s motion to dismiss and holding the county properly stated a claim for 
relief; properly pleaded causation, including proximate cause; and showed a continuing 
violation of the FHA such that the statute of limitations had not yet began to toll); City of 
Los Angeles, 22 F. Supp. 3d at 1047–48, 1057–58 (denying Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss 
because the City of Los Angeles adequately pleaded causation, proximate cause, 
continuing violation sufficient to delay the tolling of the two-year statute of limitations, 
and other requirements under the FHA). 
 31. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1301 (2017). 
 32. Id. at 1300–01. 
 33. Id. at 1301. 
 34. Id. 
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The City charged that the Banks’ discriminatory conduct 
disproportionately caused foreclosures and vacancies in minority 
communities in Miami, which “(1) ‘adversely impacted the racial 
composition of the City,’ (2) ‘impaired the City’s goals to assure racial 
integration and desegregation,’ [and] (3) ‘frustrate[d] the City’s long-
standing and active interest in promoting fair housing and securing 
the benefits of an integrated community .	.	.	.’”35 The complaints 
further alleged that those foreclosures and vacancies harmed the City 
by decreasing the property values of both the foreclosed properties 
themselves and of nearby properties, thereby “reduc[ing] property tax 
revenues to the City.”36 Moreover, the City claimed that the Banks’ 
actions forced the City to spend more on municipal services to 
remedy blight and unsafe and dangerous conditions that exist in areas 
where properties were foreclosed as a result of the Banks’ illegal 
lending practices.37 The City presented statistical analyses tracing the 
City’s financial losses to the Banks’ discriminatory practices.38 
B. Bank of America Opinion 
The district court dismissed the City’s complaints.39 The district 
court held that, to make out a claim under the FHA, the City was 
required to demonstrate that its injuries were proximately caused by 
the Banks’ unlawful conduct.40 At the time the district court issued its 
 
 35. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 36. Id. (alteration in original).  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1302. 
 39. See City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 13-24508-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 
2014 WL 11380948, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 801 F.3d 1258 (11th 
Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017); 
City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 13-24506-CIV, 2014 WL 3362348, at *7 (S.D. Fla. 
2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1296 
(2017). The City filed separate complaints against the Banks. The complaints in each case 
were nearly identical. City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 801 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 
2015), vacated sub nom. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (“The 
complaints in each case were largely identical .	.	.	.”). The cases were heard separately by 
the district court and by the Eleventh Circuit, but both Eleventh Circuit opinions issued 
nearly identical rulings in the two cases. See id. at 1258, 1265 (noting that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s reasoning is set forth in detail in the companion case Bank of America and that 
their legal conclusions in that case apply equally here and dictate the same results); see 
also City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated, 
137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and 
consolidated them for review. Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1296. 
 40. Bank of Am., 2014 WL 3362348, at *3–7. The district court’s rulings addressed a 
number of distinct legal issues, including the City’s unjust enrichment claim, the statute of 
limitations, and standing, but the focus of this Article relates solely to its holding regarding 
proximate cause and, thus, the proximate cause holding will be the only one discussed in 
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opinion, no circuit courts of appeals had yet applied proximate cause 
to the FHA.41 The district court nevertheless concluded that the 
requirement existed and that the City had failed to satisfy it because 
the causal chain linking the Banks’ conduct and the City’s injuries was 
“too attenuated” and relied on the conduct of third parties.42 The 
Eleventh Circuit reversed.43 It agreed with the district court that 
proximate cause was required under the FHA but held that the 
standard was whether the City’s injuries were a foreseeable 
consequence of the Banks’ conduct.44 The circuit court concluded that 
the City had alleged facts sufficient to satisfy this standard.45 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.46 
The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit and district courts 
that proximate cause is a required element of a claim under the 
FHA.47 The Supreme Court and lower courts reached this conclusion 
based on a recently decided Supreme Court case, Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,48 which held 
that proximate cause—traditionally a common law tort concept—is a 
presumptively required element of all statutory claims.49 The 
 
detail in the remainder of the Article. See Wells Fargo & Co., 2014 WL 11380948, at *1 
(discussing the City’s unjust enrichment claim); Bank of Am., 2014 WL 3362348, at *1–7 
(discussing standing, under the FHA, including proximate cause and the statute of 
limitations). 
 41. See Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (making reference to the fact that no other 
circuit courts of appeal, aside from the Eleventh Circuit, had found proximate cause to be 
a requirement under the FHA); Wells Fargo & Co., 801 F.3d at 1267 (incorporating by 
reference the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of proximate cause under the FHA in Bank of 
America and citing no other circuit courts of appeals in its analysis of a proximate cause 
requirement under the FHA); Bank of Am., 800 F.3d at 1279 (noting that two other 
circuits have recognized that “[i]f the City’s claim is functionally a tort action, then 
presumably the City must adequately plead proximate cause .	.	.	.” (citing Pac. Shores 
Props., LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1167–68, 1168 n.38 (9th Cir. 2013))); 
Bank of Am., 2014 WL 3362348, at *3 (citing no circuit court of appeals decision to 
support its holding that proximate cause is a requirement under the FHA). But see 
Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 114 F.3d 1227, 1234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(indirectly discussing proximate cause as it relates to proving lost profits damages but not 
directly linking it to the FHA). 
 42. Bank of Am., 2014 WL 3362348, at *5. The court reached this conclusion by 
applying the Supreme Court’s holding in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), which declared proximate cause a presumptive 
requirement in all statutory causes of action. See id. at *3 (citing Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 
133). 
 43. Wells Fargo & Co., 801 F.3d at 1267; Bank of Am., 800 F.3d at 1289. 
 44. Bank of Am., 800 F.3d at 1282. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1302. 
 47. Id. at 1305. 
 48. 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 
 49. Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1305 (citing Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129). 
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Supreme Court reasoned that Lexmark’s general presumption is 
applicable to the FHA because a claim for damages under the FHA is 
“akin to a ‘tort action.’”50 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected both the district court 
and the Eleventh Circuit’s standards for proximate cause.51 The Court 
declared that proximate cause analysis is controlled by “the nature of 
the statutory cause of action.”52 The Court reasoned that the context 
of the FHA necessitated a proximate cause standard stricter than that 
provided by foreseeability: 
In the context of the FHA, foreseeability alone does not ensure 
the close connection that proximate cause requires. The 
housing market is interconnected with economic and social life. 
A violation of the FHA may, therefore, “be expected to cause 
ripples of harm to flow” far beyond the defendant’s misconduct. 
Nothing in the statute suggests that Congress intended to 
provide a remedy wherever those ripples travel. And 
entertaining suits to recover damages for any foreseeable result 
of an FHA violation would risk “massive and complex damages 
litigation.”53 
Without further reasoning, the Court then proclaimed that 
“proximate cause under the FHA requires ‘some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’”54 It 
stated that a damages claim under the statute is analogous to common 
law tort claims, and “[the Court] ha[s] repeatedly applied directness 
principles to statutes with ‘common-law foundations.’”55 The Court 
then added that “‘[t]he general tendency’ in these cases, ‘in regard to 
damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.’ What falls within 
that ‘first step’ depends in part on the ‘nature of the statutory cause of 
action,’ and an assessment ‘of what is administratively possible and 
convenient[.]’”56 The Court ended its analysis there.57 Rather than 
proceeding to announce a specific standard, the Court expressly 
declined to “draw the precise boundaries of proximate cause under 
the FHA and to determine on which side of the line the City’s 
 
 50. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003)). 
 51. Id. at 1306. 
 52. Id. (quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133). 
 53. Id. (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534, 545 (1982)). 
 54. Id. (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). 
 55. Id. (quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457 (2006)). 
 56. Id. (first quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010); then 
quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133; and then quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268). 
 57. See id. 
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financial injuries fall.”58 Claiming to lack the benefit of the lower 
courts’ judgment, the Court invited them to define “in the first 
instance, the contours of proximate cause under the FHA.”59 
The Court’s decision to remand to the lower courts is a direct 
product of the deep incoherence in the Court’s statutory proximate 
cause case law. As Parts II and III will demonstrate, the Court’s 
precedent has become so jumbled and inconsistent that Bank of 
America is best understood as the culmination of this incoherence. 
II.  PROXIMATE CAUSE 
Before discussing the Supreme Court’s proximate cause doctrine, 
it is necessary to clarify the distinction between proximate cause (also 
known as “legal cause”) and factual cause (also known as “cause in 
fact”). At common law, causation requires both factual cause and 
proximate cause.60 The concept of factual cause is “an ordinary, 
matter-of-fact inquiry into the existence .	.	. of a causal relation as 
laypeople would view it.”61 To determine factual cause, courts ask 
whether the alleged injuries would have occurred absent the 
defendant’s conduct.62 As will be discussed in greater detail infra, the 
concept of proximate cause, by contrast, is concerned with whether 
the alleged harm is sufficiently connected to the injurious conduct so 
as to be considered legally cognizable.63 Thus, proximate cause is 
focused not on whether the injury can be attributed to the wrongful 
conduct as a matter of fact but on whether the degree of connection 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. I use the word “claiming” because the lower courts had already lent their 
judgment on the question of the proper standard for proximate cause under the FHA. See 
City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 801 F.3d 1258, 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated 
sub nom. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017); City of Miami v. 
Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1282 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) 
(holding that the appropriate standard for proximate cause under the FHA is 
“foreseeability”); City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 13-24506-CIV, 2014 WL 
3362348, at *5 (S.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (holding that proximate cause under the FHA required the 
plaintiff to show that the injuries were not “too attenuated” and did not rely on the 
conduct of third parties). 
 60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§§	26, 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 61. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014) (quoting FOWLER V. HARPER, 
FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, 4 HARPER, JAMES, AND GRAY ON TORTS 
§	20.2, at 100 (3d ed. 2007)).  
 62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§	26; see also Haley, supra note 19, at 148. 
 63. Id. §	29. 
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between the wrongful conduct and the harm is sufficient to give rise 
to legal liability.64 
A. Proximate Cause Doctrine in Common Law 
The modern-day concept of proximate cause is typically traced to 
the foundational torts case Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.65 
Palsgraf involved a plaintiff who was injured when a railroad guard 
accidentally pushed a passenger, causing the passenger to drop a box 
containing fireworks.66 The box was wrapped in newspaper such that 
there was nothing to suggest it contained hazardous material.67 The 
fireworks exploded, dislodging some scales on the railroad track that 
struck the plaintiff and caused her injuries.68 Chief Judge Cardozo, 
writing for the majority, cast the issue as whether the plaintiff had a 
legally protected interest that had been violated.69 Cardozo reasoned 
that whether the plaintiff had a legally protected interest depended 
on whether her injuries were within the “range of apprehension” of a 
risk reasonably perceived by the defendant.70 Cardozo then held that 
negligence liability does not extend where conduct that “threatens an 
insignificant invasion of an interest in property results in an 
unforeseeable invasion of an interest of another order.”71 Judge 
Andrews, in dissent, framed the issue as one of proximate cause.72 In 
a quotation now often cited in cases and commentary on proximate 
cause, Andrews provided a definition for the concept: “What we .	.	. 
mean by the word ‘proximate’ is that, because of convenience, of 
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines 
to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is 
practical politics.”73 
 
 64. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §	41, 
at 263 (5th ed. 1984); see also Kelley, supra note 19, at 52; Stapleton, Legal Cause, supra 
note 19, at 968. 
 65. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). For excellent histories of the evolution of proximate 
cause doctrine, see generally H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 
130–304 (2d ed. 1985); Kelley, supra note 19, at 54–82; Stapleton, Legal Cause, supra note 
19, at 969–81; Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735 (1985); 
Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics and 
Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1004–
11 (1988). 
 66. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99. 
 67. Id. at 99, 101. 
 68. Id. at 99. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 100. 
 71. Id. at 101. 
 72. See id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 103. 
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The disagreement between Judges Cardozo and Andrews in 
Palsgraf set the stage for the modern-day debate on proximate 
cause.74 On one side of the debate stand those whose reasoning 
derives from Cardozo’s view that proximate cause is rooted in the 
same principles as the standard of care for negligence liability, which 
extends liability to conduct posing a foreseeable risk of harm to 
others.75 Since foreseeability is the basis for liability under general 
tort law, adherents to this view contend that a consistent standard for 
proximate cause asks whether the plaintiff’s injury was a foreseeable 
result of the defendant’s act.76 Those on the other side of the debate, 
often classified as legal realists, follow Andrews’s line of reasoning 
and believe that proximate cause is a reflection of policy choices 
about how far liability should extend.77 They argue that proximate 
cause demands an inquiry into whether, as a fundamental policy of 
the law, the defendant’s liability should extend so far as to cover the 
harm alleged.78 The most critical theorists in this camp posit that 
proximate cause is simply judicial legislation disguised as doctrine.79 
While these two theories serve as poles anchoring the modern 
debate, both the courts’ and the academy’s attempts to articulate the 
purpose and meaning of proximate cause have been extraordinarily 
muddled.80 Within a span of only three years, from 2011 to 2014, the 
 
 74. Although Palsgraf served to frame the modern-day debate around proximate 
cause, the judges’ differing viewpoints grew out of proximate cause theories that had been 
developing for quite some time. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE 
CAUSE 77 (1927); Kelley, supra note 19, at 68–70. The doctrine emerged around the same 
time as other significant limitations on tort liability developed, including privity of 
contract, contributory negligence, and the statutory purpose limitation on negligence 
liability for breach of a statutory duty. Kelley, supra note 19, at 71. Scholars date modern 
proximate cause doctrine to the middle of the nineteenth century. The first major torts 
treatise, published in 1864, recognized proximate cause and described it as limiting liability 
to the consequences of the negligent act “that ensue in the ordinary and natural course of 
events.” C. G. ADDISON, WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES, BEING A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS 5 (2d ed. 1864). 
 75. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 19, at 91. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. argued 
that this standard rests on two principles: “maximum deterrence of dangerous conduct 
consistent with maximum freedom for individual action when such deterrence is not 
possible.” Id. Theorists who believe that proximate cause simply adds a layer to the 
existing negligence standard thus believe that the goal of proximate cause should be to 
preserve freedom of action by protecting defendants from limitless liability for all the 
results that flow from a single negligent act. Id. at 104. 
 76. See id. at 92. 
 77. See id. at 104. 
 78. See Haley, supra note 19, at 148. 
 79. See Kelley, supra note 19, at 104. 
 80. See Allen, supra note 19, at 85–87. Each of the three versions of the Restatement of 
Torts has a different conception of proximate cause. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §	29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An 
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Supreme Court described the concept of proximate cause as 
“shorthand for the policy-based judgment that not all factual causes 
contributing to an injury should be legally cognizable causes,”81 as 
“serv[ing] .	.	. to preclude liability in situations where the causal link 
between conduct and result is so attenuated that the consequence is 
more aptly described as mere fortuity,”82 and as reflective of “[t]he 
difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the 
damages caused by some remote action.”83 
Unable to settle on the purpose of the doctrine, the Supreme 
Court and lower courts have adopted a range of inconsistent 
standards for proximate cause. In some cases, courts ask whether the 
intervention of a third party or event leading to the harm discharges 
the defendant from liability by breaking the “chain of causation.”84 In 
other instances, courts focus on the overall length of the chain of 
causation and ask whether the harm was “direct” or “remote.”85 Yet 
another iteration is based on whether the plaintiff’s harm was 
“foreseeable”; a slight variation of that standard asks whether the 
harm caused to the plaintiff could be “reasonably foreseen.”86 Courts 
at times combine the standards and at other times treat them as 
alternative formulations.87 Moreover, the variation in standards is 
 
actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s 
conduct tortious.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	431 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) 
(“The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the 
actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the 
harm.”); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL HARMS TO PERSONS, LAND, AND 
CHATTELS §	431 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (“The words ‘legal cause’ are used throughout the 
Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact that the manner in which the actor’s 
tortious conduct has resulted in an invasion of some legally protected interest of another is 
such that the law regards it just to hold the actor responsible for such harm.”). 
 81. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 701 (2011). 
 82. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 445 (2014). 
 83. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 135 (2014) 
(quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 458 (2006)). 
 84. Stapleton, Legal Cause, supra note 19, at 969. 
 85. Id. at 968. 
 86. Id. at 968, 992. 
 87. See Allen, supra note 19, at 87–88, 87–88 nn.48–50 (discussing instances where 
courts have combined both formulations into one rule statement); Stapleton, Legal Cause, 
supra note 19, at 996 (categorizing the formulations as “alternative general rules”). The 
Supreme Court has recently lamented the lack of a uniform definition for proximate 
cause, summarizing that “[c]ommon-law formulations include, inter alia, the ‘immediate’ 
or ‘nearest’ antecedent test; the ‘efficient, producing cause’ test; the ‘substantial factor’ 
test; and the ‘probable,’ or ‘natural and probable,’ or ‘foreseeable’ consequence test.” CSX 
Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 701 (2011) (first citing Jeremiah Smith, Legal 
Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 106–21 (1911); and then citing Jeremiah 
Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (Concluded), 25 HARV. L. REV. 303, 311 (1912)). 
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only a part of the total doctrinal chaos––the standards themselves 
have also proven elusive. As scholars and courts alike frequently 
acknowledge, “directness,” “natural and probable cause,” 
“foreseeability,” and “superseding cause” are all malleable concepts 
that fail to denote consistent meaning.88 
The fluidity in the Supreme Court’s and lower courts’ standards 
has led proximate cause to become “notoriously flexible and 
theoretically inconsistent, an empty vessel, into which the courts can 
pour multiple meanings.”89 Leading torts commentators have levied 
harsh criticisms at the doctrine;90 a major torts treatise denounced 
that “[t]here is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has 
called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in 
such a welter of confusion.”91 The Second Circuit similarly 
admonished the doctrine:  
“Proximate cause,” in short, has been an extraordinarily 
changeable concept. “Having no integrated meaning of its own, 
its chameleon quality permits it to be substituted for any one of 
the elements of a negligence case when decision on that 
element becomes difficult. .	.	. No other formula .	.	. so nearly 
does the work of Aladdin’s lamp.”92 
 
 88. For this reason, proximate cause is often held out as the primary example of 
doctrinal indeterminacy. See Allen, supra note 19, at 93, 93 n.79; see also W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, §	42, at 273; Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, supra 
note 8, at 1203. In an early influential article about proximate cause, Henry Edgerton 
criticized directness and foreseeability as too flexible of concepts to be meaningful. See 
Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211, 214–31 (1924). Regarding 
directness, he asked, “Is not directness a matter of degree?” Id. at 215. He then observed: 
In most cases .	.	. the connection between the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s 
injury may well be regarded .	.	. as involving a single step, or as involving several 
steps. The question is simply how far one’s taste will take him in the subdivision of 
what is indefinitely, or infinitely, subdivisible. Tastes differ. 
Id. Regarding foreseeability, Edgerton asked: “Is the ‘foreseen danger’ a danger of the 
intervention of the identical force which does intervene, or is it enough if there is danger 
of the intervention of a force of similar character; and if the latter, how closely similar 
must it be?” Id. at 231. More recently, Jane Stapleton has argued that, “in disputes .	.	. 
concerning the nature of the consequence of which a complaint is made, the vacuity of the 
mere assertion of an outcome being ‘too remote’ or ‘not proximate’ is patent, especially in 
cases where the effect is instantaneous and spatially very near.” Stapleton, Legal Cause, 
supra note 19, at 969. 
 89. See Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 8, at 1200. 
 90. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, §	41, at 263. 
 91. Id. 
 92. AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 217 n.8 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, §	42, at 276). 
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B. Proximate Cause in Statutory Claims 
Despite the criticisms of this common law concept, the Supreme 
Court has increasingly imported the concept of proximate cause into 
statutory claims.93 In doing so, it has produced a parallel doctrine for 
proximate cause in statutory claims that is just as muddled, 
incoherent, and indeterminate as the doctrine that exists in common 
law claims. This section outlines the background of that doctrine and 
its convolutedness. 
In 1983, the Supreme Court first expressly declared a proximate 
cause requirement under a statute—the Clayton Act—the text of 
which does not include the words “proximate cause.”94 Since 2004, the 
Court has read a proximate cause requirement into statutes with 
growing frequency.95 The statutes include USERRA, the Federal 
Employers Liability Act (“FELA”), and the Lanham Act, among 
others.96 These statutes do not facially refer to proximate cause, but 
the Court has reasoned that the statutes’ structural resemblance to a 
common law tort, combined with the use of general causal language 
in the statutory text, indicate Congress’s intent to impose some 
limitation on the “ripples of harm”97 that are recoverable.98 In 2013, 
scholar Sandra Sperino coined the term “statutory proximate cause” 
to describe this development.99 One year later, in 2014, the Court 
declared proximate cause a presumptive requirement in all statutory 
causes of actions, stating that “we generally presume that a statutory 
 
 93. See generally Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 8, at 1216, 1216 n.79. 
 94. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 529–35 (1983). In a 1982 case, the Supreme Court discussed proximate cause 
in a statutory claim but did so within the context of standing, not as an element of the 
cause of action. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477–78 (1982). 
 95. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 97. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) (quoting 
Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 534). 
 98. See Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 8, at 1200. Sperino observes 
that courts have justified applying proximate cause to statutory causes of action by relying 
on a variety of “demonstrably weak textual, intent, and purpose-based arguments.” Id. 
“Courts often find general causal language in a statute, such as the words ‘because of’ or 
‘by reason of,’ and then conclude that these terms refer to both cause in fact and 
proximate cause.” Id. at 1217–18. Courts also make two types of legislative intent 
arguments: that the particular statute is the product of a common-law tort tradition and 
that civil statutes in general are enacted against a tort law backdrop. See id. at 1219–20; see 
also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011); Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 
U.S. 258, 266–68 (1992); Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 532–33. 
 99. See Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 8, at 1200. 
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cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately 
caused by violations of the statute.”100 
Despite the substantial body of case law that has emerged on 
statutory proximate cause, no clear precedent dictates how to 
determine the meaning of proximate cause in a given statutory 
context. Much like in the common law context, the Supreme Court 
has not articulated a uniform standard for statutory proximate cause. 
Standards that the Court has employed for proximate cause in 
statutory claims include whether the injury was “direct”101 or in 
“direct relation” to the unlawful conduct;102 whether a superseding 
cause extinguishes liability;103 whether the harm caused was “‘too 
remote,’ ‘purely contingent,’ or ‘indirec[t]’”;104 and whether the harm 
is “substantial enough and close enough .	.	. to be recognized by 
law.”105 The Court rarely acknowledges that the standard it is 
applying in one statutory context differs from that it has applied in 
another, and when it does so, it provides little to no reasoning for the 
inconsistency. 
Yet the variation in the Court’s standards merely scratches the 
surface of the incoherence underlying statutory proximate cause 
doctrine. The Court’s failure to settle on what the announced 
standards substantively mean has resulted in a morass of conflicting 
case law that seems to have caused confusion not only in the lower 
courts but in the Supreme Court itself. Nowhere is this confusion 
better illustrated than in the Supreme Court’s case law on how to 
apply the “directness” standard to causal chains involving multiple 
steps—meaning at least one intermediate or intervening cause106 
between the conduct and the injury. The four most recent Supreme 
Court cases to confront this issue are Hemi Group, LLC v. City of 
New York,107 Staub v. Proctor Hospital,108 Lexmark, and Bank of 
America. In each case, the Court treats differently the issues of (1) 
 
 100. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132 
(2014). 
 101. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540. 
 102. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457 (2006). 
 103. Staub, 562 U.S. at 420. 
 104. Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010) (quoting Holmes v. 
Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269, 271 (1992)). 
 105. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 704 (2004). 
 106. The Court appears to use the terms “intervening cause” and “intermediate cause” 
interchangeably, and this Article discerns no underlying difference in the way the terms 
are applied. 
 107. 559 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 108. 562 U.S. 411 (2011). 
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how many steps are allowed in the causal chain and (2) how to 
evaluate multiple steps where they exist. 
In Hemi Group, the Court held that the directness standard 
cannot be satisfied where a causal chain involves more than one 
step.109 The Court first asserted that proximate cause under the 
statute at issue, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (“RICO”),110 requires directness, and, thus, “[a] link [between the 
conduct and the injury] that is ‘too remote,’ ‘purely contingent,’ or 
‘indirec[t]’ is insufficient.”111 The Court did not elaborate on what 
qualifies as “‘too remote,’ ‘purely contingent,’ or ‘indirec[t]’” and 
instead imported language from precedent that “[t]he general 
tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond 
the first step.”112 After asserting that this general tendency applies to 
proximate cause inquiries under RICO, the Court held that 
proximate cause was not satisfied because it involved more than one 
step.113 
Yet one year later, in Staub, the Court held that a causal chain 
involving two distinct steps satisfied the directness standard for 
proximate cause for a claim brought under a different statute, 
USERRA.114 The Court made no reference to the standard it had 
employed a year earlier regarding the “general tendency of the law 
.	.	. not to go beyond the first step,”115 neither expressly disavowing it 
nor attempting to explain why it did not apply in the particular 
statutory context at issue.116 The Court instead set forth an additional 
test to determine whether a multistep chain satisfies the directness 
standard: the intervening cause must not be “superseding,” meaning 
that it must not be “a cause of independent origin that was not 
foreseeable.”117 
 
 109. See Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 10. 
 110. RICO is a federal law that establishes criminal penalties and a private civil cause 
of action for acts involving organized crime. See 18 U.S.C. §§	1961–1968 (2012). The civil 
cause of action is available where a private party is injured in his or her “business or 
property” by a “racketeer.” Id. §	1964. 
 111. Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 9 (third alteration in original) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. 
Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 271, 274 (1992)). 
 112. Id. at 10 (alterations in original) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271–72). 
 113. Id. (holding that, “[b]ecause the City’s theory of causation requires us to move 
well beyond the first step, that theory cannot meet RICO’s direct relationship 
requirement”). 
 114. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419–20 (2011). 
 115. Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 10 (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271–72). 
 116. Staub, 562 U.S. at 419–20. 
 117. Id. at 420 (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)). The 
Court also repeated that directness excludes “link[s] that [are] too remote, purely 
contingent, or indirect.” Id. at 419 (alterations in original) (quoting Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 
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Three years later, however, in Lexmark, the Court modified the 
directness standard yet again and articulated a new set of parameters 
for causal chains involving multiple steps.118 Ignoring the precedent of 
Staub, the Court made the blanket statement that a causal chain 
involving an intervening step is not direct.119 However, the Court held 
that proximate cause may be satisfied even if the directness standard 
is not met.120 The Court determined that proximate cause is satisfied 
where the injury alleged is “integral” to the violation alleged and/or 
where the multistep causal chain will not give rise to “speculative .	.	. 
proceedings” or “intricate, uncertain inquiries.”121 Despite the fact 
that Justice Scalia authored both opinions,122 the Court did not 
explain why it was adopting an interpretation of the directness 
standard that was inconsistent with Staub.123 It is therefore unclear 
whether the opinion reverses Staub or instead constitutes an 
alternative formulation that keeps Staub intact.  
The Court’s opinion in Bank of America both reflects and 
solidifies the doctrinal incoherence created by these prior cases’ 
treatment of the directness standard. There, the Court declared that a 
 
9). Like in Hemi Group, the Court did not explain how to determine whether a given link 
is “too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.” Id. (quoting Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 9). It 
simply concluded, without stating its reasoning, that the link at issue was not “remote” or 
“purely contingent.” Id. 
 118. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 134 (2014). 
 119. Id. at 139 (“To be sure, on this view, the causal chain linking Static Control’s 
injuries to consumer confusion is not direct, but includes the intervening link of injury to 
the remanufacturers.”). The Court made no reference to the criteria it had employed in 
Hemi Group for evaluating intervening links. Id. at 137–40; see also Staub, 562 U.S. at 419–
20 (“Proximate cause requires only ‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and 
the injurious conduct alleged,’ and excludes only those ‘link[s] that [are] too remote, 
purely contingent, or indirect.’ .	.	. Nor can the [intervening cause] be deemed a 
superseding cause of the harm. A cause can be thought ‘superseding’ only if it is a ‘cause 
of independent origin that was not foreseeable.’” (first and second alterations in original) 
(footnote omitted) (first quoting Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 10; and then quoting Exxon Co., 
517 U.S. at 837). 
 120. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 139 (stating that “[Plaintiff]’s allegations therefore might not 
support standing under a strict application of the ‘general tendency’ not to stretch 
proximate causation ‘beyond the first step’” and then determining that plaintiff 
nonetheless satisfied the requirements for proximate cause at the pleading stage (quoting 
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271). 
 121. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 
459–60 (2006)). The language “and/or” is used because it is unclear from the Court’s 
opinion whether proximate cause may be satisfied in either of these circumstances or 
whether each circumstance is a requisite element which must be met. 
 122. See id. at 120; Staub, 562 U.S. at 412. 
 123. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 134–37 (discussing the directness standard without citing to 
or distinguishing away Staub). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 529 (2019) 
2019] THE PROXIMATE CAUSE STANDARD 551 
directness standard must be met124 but incorporated neither Staub’s 
nor Lexmark’s approaches to multistep causal chains. It instead 
distorted Lexmark’s holding and appeared to revive Hemi Group and 
other precedent that predates all three cases. The Court stated: 
“The general tendency” in [cases requiring directness for 
proximate cause] “in regard to damages at least, is not to go 
beyond the first step.” What falls within that step depends in 
part on the “nature of the statutory cause of action,” and an 
assessment “of what is administratively possible and 
convenient.”125 
Yet Lexmark held not that all causal chains must be characterized as 
constituting a single step in order to satisfy proximate cause but, quite 
to the contrary, that the chain may go beyond the first step if doing so 
does not introduce speculation.126 Furthermore, the Court’s statement 
in Bank of America that “what falls within that [first] step” of the 
causal chain depends in part on “what is administratively possible and 
convenient”127 is particularly unsettling because in Lexmark the Court 
had not applied such factors to the proximate cause inquiry.128 The 
Court in Lexmark specifically held that, although the difficulty of 
ascertaining damages and the risk of speculation are “‘motivating 
principle[s]’ behind the proximate-cause requirement,” these factors 
cannot serve as an “independent basis” to determine whether the 
requirement is satisfied.129 
 
 124. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017). 
 125. Id. (first quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010); then 
quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133; and then quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268). 
 126. The Court stated: 
[The Plaintiff]’s allegations therefore might not support standing under a strict 
application of “the general tendency” not to stretch proximate causation “beyond 
the first step.” But the reason for that general tendency is that there ordinarily is a 
“discontinuity” between the injury to the direct victim and the injury to the 
indirect victim, so that the latter is not surely attributable to the former .	.	. but 
might instead have resulted from “any number of [other] reasons.” That is not the 
case here. [The Plaintiff]’s allegations suggest that if [the first step occurred], then 
it would follow more or less automatically that [the injury occurred] for the same 
reason, without the need for any “speculative .	.	. proceedings” or “intricate, 
uncertain inquiries.” 
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 139–40 (third and seventh alterations in original) (first quoting 
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271; and then quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 
458–60 (2006)). 
 127. Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1299 (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268). 
 128. See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 132–37. 
 129. See id. at 135 (quoting Anza, 547 U.S. at 457–58). 
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The Court’s opinion in Bank of America does not expressly 
reject the Court’s approaches to multistep causal chains in Staub and 
Lexmark.130 It simply adds to the web of confusion, incorporating 
language from precedent selectively—and inaccurately—and 
announcing yet a different set of criteria for determining whether 
directness is satisfied where the causal chain involves multiple steps. 
Thus, it is unsurprising that the Court ultimately got stuck in the 
tangles of its own web. The Court was unable to further define the 
meaning of proximate cause in claims brought under the FHA and 
made the rare move of remanding to the district court on a purely 
legal question that had already been briefed by the parties and 
decided by both lower courts.131 This dead-end moment was over a 
decade in the making: with each new statutory proximate cause case, 
the Supreme Court seemed to add a fresh twist to the concept while 
simultaneously looping back to old formulations, never expressly 
rejecting prior iterations and often subtly distorting them along the 
way. 
III.  THREE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS IN STATUTORY 
PROXIMATE CAUSE DOCTRINE 
This part unravels the web of confusion that has emerged in 
statutory proximate cause doctrine. While the scholarship on 
proximate cause tends to concentrate on the inconsistent and 
unworkable formulations of the concept, this discussion shifts the 
focus to the Supreme Court’s analytical approaches in reaching those 
formulations and their meanings. This part demonstrates that the 
Court has embraced competing analytical frameworks to determine 
the meaning of proximate cause in a statutory context. It then 
synthesizes the frameworks the Court has applied into three 
categories: (1) common law, (2) public policy, and (3) legislative 
intent. These frameworks are the source of deep disagreements 
within the Court, such that neither the Court nor the individual 
Justices have been able to settle on the proper one to apply. Justice 
Scalia, for example, at one time applied the legislative intent 
framework and, at another time, advocated for the common law 
framework.132 This part argues that the incoherence in statutory 
proximate cause doctrine, which has culminated in the Court’s dead-
 
 130. Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1305–06 (making no reference to Staub and citing 
Lexmark for general assertions about the existence of statutory proximate cause but not 
expressly rejecting any part of the Lexmark analysis). 
 131. Id. at 1306. 
 132. See infra Section III.C. 
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end analysis in Bank of America, is anchored in the coexistence of 
these three analytical frameworks. 
A. Roots of the Three Frameworks: Associated General Contractors 
of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters 
The first case to interpret the meaning of proximate cause in a 
statute that was facially silent on the concept, Associated General 
Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of 
Carpenters,133 provided the foundation for the emergence of the three 
analytical frameworks.134 Associated General Contractors called on 
the Court to determine the meaning of proximate cause under the 
Clayton Act, which authorizes suits by parties “injured in [their] 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws .	.	.	.”135 Specifically, the issue before the Court was whether a 
union could establish proximate cause under the Clayton Act where it 
alleged that the defendant, a multiemployer association, coerced third 
parties to enter into business relationships with nonunion firms.136 
The union alleged that this coercion adversely affected the trade of 
“certain unionized firms and thereby restrained the business activities 
of the union.”137 
The Court began its proximate cause analysis by engaging in 
statutory analysis. The Court observed that the legislative history 
shows that the Sherman Act (the predecessor to the Clayton Act) was 
enacted to guarantee customers the benefits of price competition and 
to protect the freedom of participants in the relevant market.138 
Explaining that the union was not a consumer or a competitor in the 
market affected by unlawful activity, the Court stated that “a union, 
in its capacity as bargaining representative, will frequently not be part 
of the class the Sherman Act was designed to protect.”139 The Court 
next turned to common law standards of proximate cause, which it 
referred to as an “additional factor” in its analysis.140 The Court 
considered whether the chain of causation between the asserted 
 
 133. 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
 134. The language “otherwise facially silent on the concept,” means that the statute 
does not expressly include the words “proximate cause.” 
 135. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 521 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 
U.S.C. §	15(a) (2012)). 
 136. Id. at 520–21. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 530. 
 139. Id. at 540. 
 140. Id. 
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injury and the alleged antitrust violation was direct or indirect.141 It 
concluded that because the chain included “several somewhat vaguely 
defined links,” the injuries suffered by the union were “only an 
indirect result” of the harm suffered by certain unionized firms.142 The 
Court then proceeded to engage in a policy analysis. The plaintiffs’ 
damages claim was “highly speculative,” it reasoned, because the 
complaint did not specify the injuries the union actually suffered as a 
result of the unlawful coercion.143 Further, indirect chains of 
causation, like the union’s, created the risk of duplicative recovery 
and would require courts to engage in complex proceedings to 
properly apportion damages.144 
Based on these three factors—the statutory purpose, the 
common law, and policy—the Court determined that the causal chain 
asserted by the union was not cognizable under the Clayton Act.145 
This precedent directly fostered the rise of these three frameworks in 
the subsequent case law. While all three approaches were present in 
the Court’s analysis, no one approach was predominant; thus, the 
Court could select and move among them in subsequent cases with 
equal precedential support. In doing so, the Court created three 
distinct analytical frameworks that are in conflict with one another, 
dictating entirely different proximate cause analyses and, in many 
instances, outcomes. 
B. The Three Frameworks 
1.  Common Law Framework 
In one group of cases, the Supreme Court applies what this 
Article terms the “common law framework” to determine the 
meaning of proximate cause under a given statutory cause of action. 
Under this framework, the Court looks to the common law as the 
authoritative source of meaning for proximate cause. The Court 
selects from among the range of options available under tort law to 
declare a proximate cause standard, setting aside the statutory 
context and policy considerations. The Court generally ignores the 
absence of a settled common law standard for proximate cause and 
treats the standard it has announced as the exclusive standard 
established by authoritative common law precedent. Under this 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 540–41. 
 143. Id. at 542. 
 144. Id. at 543–44. 
 145. Id. at 545–46. 
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framework, the Court also regards the common law standard itself as 
sufficient to dictate the meaning of proximate cause. Practically 
speaking, this often means that the Court describes the outcome as 
axiomatic once it has announced a particular standard. 
Staub provides a classic illustration of the Court’s application of 
the common law framework. In that case, the Court considered the 
meaning of proximate cause under USERRA.146 Specifically, the 
Court considered whether proximate cause was satisfied where an 
employee, who was subject to discriminatorily motivated corrective 
action in violation of USERRA, was subsequently terminated based 
in part on that discriminatory action.147 The Court cited to the 
discussion of the common law in Associated General Contractors and 
declared that proximate cause “requires only ‘some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,’ and 
excludes only those ‘link[s] that [are] too remote, purely contingent, 
or indirect.’”148 The Court then concluded, without further reasoning, 
that the causal chain was not “remote” or “purely contingent.”149 The 
Court repeated this two-step line of reasoning––importation of a 
common law standard followed by a declaration that the standard is 
met––in the following two sentences of the opinion: “Nor can the 
ultimate decisionmaker’s judgment be deemed a superseding cause of 
the harm. A cause can be thought ‘superseding’ only if it is a ‘cause of 
independent origin that was not foreseeable.’”150 The opinion 
contained no further analysis. 
The common law framework appeared again in Hemi Group, 
where the Court determined the meaning of proximate cause in a civil 
RICO claim.151 The Court began its proximate cause analysis by 
declaring that “[p]roximate cause for RICO purposes .	.	. should be 
evaluated in light of its common-law foundations.”152 The Court then 
cited to precedent for the proposition that the common law standard 
for proximate cause “requires ‘some direct relation between the 
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’ A link that is ‘too 
 
 146. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419–20 (2011). 
 147. Id. at 416–17. 
 148. Id. at 419 (alterations in original) (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 
559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)). 
 149. Id. (“We do not think that the [fact of the intermediate cause] automatically 
renders the link to the [unlawful conduct] ‘remote’ or ‘purely contingent.’”). Here, too, the 
Court simply concluded that the standard was not met, without providing reasoning or 
justification. Id. at 420. 
 150. Id. at 420 (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)). 
 151. Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 8 (2010). 
 152. Id. at 9. 
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remote,’ ‘purely contingent,’ or ‘indirec[t]’ is insufficient.”153 After 
applying this standard to the facts of the case at issue, the Court 
provided a very limited explanation of why this particular common 
law formulation was selected rather than any other.154 
2.  Public Policy Framework 
In a second set of cases, the Court adopted a “public policy 
framework.” Under this framework, the Court engages in policy 
analysis to determine the meaning of proximate cause in a given 
statutory claim. The Court identifies public policy factors that it 
deems relevant to proximate cause and then considers how those 
factors interact with the statutory cause of action and the facts of the 
case before it. Thus, in cases analyzed through this framework, the 
application of proximate cause is simply a reflection of, and a proxy 
for, a policy-based approach to limiting liability. 
In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,155 the Court 
applied a public policy framework to determine the meaning of 
proximate cause in a different type of civil RICO claim. The plaintiff, 
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”), alleged that 
the defendants conspired in a stock-manipulation scheme in violation 
of RICO that ultimately caused multiple companies’ stock values to 
plummet.156 Two broker-dealers had bought substantial amounts of 
these stocks with their own funds such that, when the stocks’ values 
declined as a result of the manipulation, the broker-dealers were left 
without sufficient funds to meet their obligations to customers.157 This 
inability to make good on the obligations triggered SIPC’s statutory 
duty to advance funds to reimburse the broker-dealers’ customers.158 
The Court considered whether the defendant’s RICO violation—
participation in a stock-manipulation scheme—could be considered a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, having to pay out the claims 
 
 153. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 
268, 271, 274 (1992)). 
 154. Id. at 12 (criticizing the dissent’s suggestion that the proximate cause 
determination turns on foreseeability without otherwise explaining why the majority’s 
formulation of proximate cause was correct). The dissent in Hemi Group criticized the 
majority for misinterpreting the common law, claiming that “under the ‘directness’ theory 
of proximate causation, there is liability for both ‘all “direct” (or “directly traceable”) 
consequences and those indirect consequences that are foreseeable.’” Id. at 25 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, §	42, at 273). 
 155. 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
 156. Id. at 261. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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of broker-dealers who were unable to satisfy their obligations to 
customers.159 
The Court began its analysis with a brief explanation of common 
law proximate cause standards.160 However, this discussion served 
primarily as a backdrop; the Court did not treat the common law 
standards or the statutory context as authoritative. Instead, the Court 
turned its attention to the policy reasons underlying why the 
directness standard and the “general tendency not to go beyond the 
first step” were applied in Associated General Contractors.161 The 
Court identified four specific policy concerns that support employing 
the directness standard for proximate cause: (1) the difficulty in 
determining the precise amount of damages attributable to the 
violation, as distinct from other intermediate causes, when a plaintiff’s 
injury is indirect; (2) the complications courts face in properly 
apportioning damages so as to avoid duplicative recovery when 
plaintiffs are further removed from the unlawful conduct; (3) the lack 
of need for deterrence when directly injured victims can be counted 
on to sue; and (4) the speculative nature of chains of causation that 
involve multiple steps.162 
The Court then assessed whether these concerns were implicated 
in the chain of causation asserted by SIPC.163 It determined that 
SIPC’s chain of causation was indeed speculative because the district 
court would need to determine that the broker-dealers’ inability to 
satisfy their obligations was caused by the stock manipulation and 
not, for example, by their poor business practices or other factors.164 
The Court also concluded that the district court would face difficulty 
in apportioning damages between the broker-dealers and SIPC if 
both parties were permitted to sue.165 The Court further reasoned that 
 
 159. See id. at 268–70. 
 160. Id. at 268. It recognized that proximate cause took “many shapes” at common law, 
among them a directness of relationship between the conduct and the injury. Id. The 
Court cited to Associated General Contractors for the proposition that “directness” is a 
central element for proximate cause applied in the Clayton Act, which includes similar 
language on causation as RICO. Id. at 268–69 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 
Inc., v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 n.33 (1983)). The Court also 
quoted the statement in Associated General Contractors that “[t]he general tendency of 
the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.” Id. at 271 
(quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 534). 
 161. Id. at 269–70 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 534). 
 162. Id.; see also id. at 272–73 (discussing the difficulty in determining whether injuries 
to nonpurchasing customers came from the alleged conspiracy as opposed to a myriad of 
other factors). 
 163. Id. at 270–74. 
 164. Id. at 272–73. 
 165. Id. at 273. 
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the broker-dealers could be counted on to sue, and, thus, there was no 
need to extend liability to SIPC in the interests of promoting 
deterrence.166 Lastly, the Court proclaimed that “[a]llowing suits by 
those injured only indirectly [by a RICO violation] would open the 
door to ‘massive and complex damages litigation[, which would] .	.	. 
burde[n] the courts .	.	.	.’”167 The Court engaged in no further analysis 
to determine the meaning of proximate cause under RICO and 
concluded, based on this policy-based reasoning, that SIPC’s claim as 
a secondary victim “does, and should, run afoul of proximate-
causation standards .	.	.	.”168 
The Supreme Court returned to the public policy framework in 
Anza v. Ideal Steel Corp.,169 a case interpreting the requirements for 
proximate cause in yet another type of civil RICO claim.170 The Court 
cited to the Holmes directness standard for proximate cause in civil 
RICO claims to begin its analysis.171 However, the Court gave 
meaning to the proximate cause requirement by invoking policy 
factors that it described as “the directness requirement’s underlying 
premises.”172 The factors the Court articulated and then proceeded to 
apply to the facts at issue mirrored those in Holmes: “the difficulty 
that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the damages caused 
by some remote action,” “the [potentially] speculative nature of the 
proceedings,” and whether “the immediate victims of an alleged .	.	. 
violation can be expected to vindicate the laws by pursuing their own 
claims.”173 It is unclear from the Court’s analysis whether the 
application of policy factors serves as a justification for the directness 
standard or as an aid to interpret what that standard means in the 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 274 (third and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983)). 
 168. Id. (concluding its proximate cause discussion after application of the policy-based 
arguments). 
 169. 547 U.S. 451 (2006). 
 170. Id. at 453. In Anza, Ideal Steel Corporation (“Ideal”) sued National Steel Supply 
(“National”), a competitor, claiming that National was engaged in an unlawful 
racketeering scheme aimed at “gain[ing] sales and market share at Ideal’s expense.” Id. at 
453–54 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Ideal alleged that National failed to 
charge the required New York sales tax to cash-paying customers, which allowed National 
to reduce its prices without affecting its profit margins. Id. at 454. It further alleged that 
National submitted fraudulent tax returns to New York State to conceal its conduct. Id. 
 171. Id. at 456–57 (“The Holmes Court turned to the common-law foundations of the 
proximate-cause requirement, and specifically the ‘demand for some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’” (quoting Holmes v. Sec. 
Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992))). 
 172. Id. at 458. 
 173. Id. at 458–60. 
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particular context.174 Regardless, the Court’s analysis boils down to an 
application of policy factors to a given set of facts to determine the 
meaning of proximate cause in the statutory cause of action. The 
Court concluded that proximate cause was not satisfied because the 
policy factors weighed against recognizing the unlawful conduct as a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.175 
3.  Legislative Intent Framework 
Finally, in a third set of cases, the Court has adopted a 
“legislative intent framework.” In these cases, the Court interpreted 
how far Congress intended recovery to extend to determine the 
meaning of proximate cause under the statute at issue.176 The Court in 
these cases thus performed a statutory analysis, employing the 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation to determine the extent of 
liability contemplated by Congress. 
The Court fully embraced the legislative intent framework in 
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,177 in which it 
considered the meaning of proximate cause under NEPA.178 Under 
NEPA, a federal agency is required to provide an Environmental 
Impact Statement (“EIS”) before it promulgates regulations that will 
cause significant environmental effects.179 The plaintiff, a nonprofit 
organization, alleged that the Department of Transportation’s 
issuance of regulations allowing cross-border operations of Mexican-
domiciled trucks caused significant environmental effects.180 The issue 
before the Court was whether, under NEPA, the Department of 
Transportation’s issuance of these regulations proximately caused the 
environmental effects, triggering the Department of Transportation’s 
obligation to provide an EIS.181 The Court characterized the proper 
 
 174. The Court states in one part of its opinion that “[t]he requirement of a direct 
causal connection is especially warranted where the immediate victims of an alleged RICO 
violation can be expected to vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims,” suggesting 
that the policy concerns dictate the standard to be applied. See id. at 460. The Court states 
in another part of the opinion, however, that “[t]he attenuated connection between 
[plaintiff]’s injury and [defendant]’s injurious conduct thus implicates fundamental [policy] 
concerns expressed in Holmes .	.	.	. [T]hese concerns help to illustrate why [plaintiff]’s 
alleged injury was not the direct result of a RICO violation.” Id. at 459. 
 175. Id. at 461. 
 176. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345–46 (2005); Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538–41 (1983). 
 177. 541 U.S. 752 (2004). 
 178. Id. at 765–69. 
 179. Id. at 763. 
 180. Id. at 759–62. 
 181. Id. at 767. 
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inquiry for proximate cause as “look[ing] to the underlying policies or 
legislative intent [of the statute] in order to draw a manageable line 
between those causal changes that may make an actor responsible for 
an effect and those that do not.”182 The Court then applied this 
analytical framework, beginning by identifying the purposes of 
NEPA’s EIS requirement.183 It described the purposes as twofold: (1) 
to ensure that the agency will take into account information 
concerning the environmental effects of a potential regulation, and 
(2) to guarantee that this information will be made available to all 
parties involved in the decision-making process.184 The Court 
analyzed whether requiring the Department of Transportation to 
produce an EIS in the particular circumstances at issue would serve 
either of these purposes.185 It concluded that such a requirement 
“would fulfill neither of these statutory purposes” and, thus, held that 
proximate cause was not satisfied.186 
The Court again applied the legislative intent framework seven 
years later in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride.187 There, the 
Court sought to determine the meaning of proximate cause under 
FELA, which holds railroads liable for employees’ injuries resulting 
from a railroad carrier’s negligence.188 To begin its analysis, the Court 
rejected the common law as the proper source to determine the 
meaning of proximate cause in the statutory context.189 The Court 
pointed to the “lack of consensus” on the proper standard for 
proximate cause in the common law and offered up a lengthy list of 
the various formulations applied in that context.190 It then cited to 
studies showing that jurors rarely understand these common law 
standards when they are incorporated into jury instructions.191 
Instead, the Court framed the proximate cause inquiry in more 
 
 182. Id. (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 
774 n.7 (1983)). 
 183. Id. at 768. The Court also stated that there is a “rule of reason” inherent in 
NEPA, which ensures that agencies determine whether and to what extent to prepare an 
EIS based on the usefulness of any new potential information to the decision-making 
process. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 768–69. 
 186. Id. at 768. The Court reasoned that the Department of Transportation had no 
discretion to decide not to issue the regulation at issue, and therefore the production of an 
EIS would be futile. Id. 
 187. 564 U.S. 685 (2011). 
 188. Id. at 688; see also 45 U.S.C. §	51 (2012). 
 189. Id. at 692–93, 702–03. 
 190. Id. at 701. 
 191. Id. at 702. 
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generalized terms that did not rely on any particular common law 
formulation, ultimately characterizing it as simply a framework for 
limiting liability.192 
To determine those limits in the context of FELA, the Court first 
looked to the statutory text, which provides that a railroad is liable for 
damages for an employee’s “injury or death resulting in whole or in 
part from [carrier] negligence.”193 The Court described this language 
as “straightforward” and reasoned that Congress’s use of “less 
legalistic language” indicates the legislature’s purpose to “loosen 
constraints on recovery.”194 The Court reasoned that this purpose 
would be undermined and the plain language blunted if it were to 
interpret the statute to impose common law requirements, such as 
that the injury must be reasonably foreseeable or must arise in a 
“natural or probable sequence” from the unlawful conduct for 
recovery to be allowed.195 The Court also looked to the broader 
objectives of FELA to supplement its interpretation of the statutory 
language.196 It summarized that FELA was enacted to enable broad 
recovery for injured railroad workers and was expressly intended to 
overcome the barriers to recovery imposed by the “harsh and 
technical rules” of state common law.197 The Court found that these 
objectives supported its interpretation that, to establish proximate 
cause, the railroad worker must show only that the railroad “caused 
or contributed to” his or her injury.198 Based on this statutory analysis, 
the Court declared that the standard for proximate causation under 
FELA is whether “[the railroad’s] negligence played a part—no 
matter how small—in bringing about the injury.”199 
The Court also adopted the legislative intent framework in 
Lexmark.200 There, the Court analyzed the meaning of proximate 
cause under the provision of the Lanham Act that prohibits false 
advertising.201 The Court framed its inquiry by noting that 
 
 192. See id. at 701 (“To prevent ‘infinite liability,’ courts and legislatures appropriately 
place limits on the chain of causation that may support recovery on any particular claim.” 
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, §	41, at 264)). 
 193. Id. at 703 (alteration in original) (quoting 45 U.S.C. §	51 (2012)). 
 194. Id. at 702–03. 
 195. Id. at 704–05. 
 196. Id. at 695–96. 
 197. Id. at 695 (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 
3 (1964)). 
 198. Id. at 705. 
 199. Id. (alteration in original). 
 200. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132–39 
(2014). 
 201. Id. at 122. 
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“[p]roximate-cause analysis is controlled by the nature of the 
statutory cause of action. The question it presents is whether the 
harm alleged has a sufficiently close connection to the conduct the 
statute prohibits.”202 The Court also considered the underlying 
purpose of the false advertising provision of the Lanham Act.203 The 
Court determined that this provision was designed to protect against 
unfair competition in the market and thus authorized suits for 
commercial injuries only.204 The Court reasoned that because the 
Lanham Act authorizes suits for commercial injuries, an intervening 
step of consumer deception must not be “fatal to the showing of 
proximate causation,” as all commercial injuries rely on this 
intermediate step.205 Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that, 
to satisfy proximate cause under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff 
“ordinarily must show economic or reputational injury flowing 
directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising; 
and that that occurs when deception of consumers causes them to 
withhold trade from the plaintiff.”206 
C. The Production of Doctrinal Incoherence 
The three frameworks have been in constant tension with one 
another throughout the statutory proximate cause case law. The 
Court’s application of the three has fluctuated: it utilized the public 
policy framework in 1992, the legislative intent framework in 2004, 
public policy again in 2006, the common law framework in 2010 and 
 
 202. Id. at 133. 
 203. Id. at 131. 
 204. Id. The Court performed a “zone of interests” test to determine standing under 
the Lanham Act. Id. at 129–30. The “zone of interests” doctrine provides that a statutory 
cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests “fall within the zone of interests 
protected by the law invoked.” Id. at 129 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 
(1984)). The zone of interests test is used to determine standing in statutory claims. Id. at 
125–26. 
 205. Id. at 133. 
 206. Id. The Lexmark Court also considered policy factors in some parts of its analysis. 
The Court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claims did not involve “‘speculative .	.	. 
proceedings’ or ‘intricate, uncertain inquiries.’” Id. at 140 (quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel 
Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 459–60 (2006)). The Article, however, classifies the Court’s 
framework as legislative intent because the Court anchored the proximate cause inquiry in 
the statutory structure and purpose. The Court considered policy factors only at the very 
end of its analysis and appeared to view these factors as providing additional support, but 
not the primary justification, for its outcome. Further, although the Court very briefly 
stated general common law rules of proximate cause, it did not utilize these in its primary 
analysis. See id. at 132. 
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2011, and legislative intent again in 2011 and 2014.207 In multiple 
cases, Justices have written dissents or concurrences criticizing the 
majority’s chosen framework and arguing that one of the other two 
frameworks should apply. In Anza, where the Court embraced a 
public policy framework, Justice Thomas wrote a dissent criticizing 
that framework and advocating for a legislative intent approach.208 In 
CSX Transportation, meanwhile, where the majority opinion applied 
a legislative intent framework, Chief Justice Roberts authored a 
dissenting opinion to which Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Alito joined 
that advocated a common law approach.209 Only a year prior to the 
Court’s release of CSX Transportation, however, the Court had 
applied the common law framework in Hemi Group, where the 
dissent argued that doing so would undermine the legislative intent of 
RICO.210 
Yet neither the Court nor the individual Justices in dissenting or 
concurring opinions have articulated principles to justify the 
fluctuation among frameworks. That is, the opinions have not 
provided explanations for why the public policy framework is the 
 
 207. For cases applying the public policy framework, see Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply 
Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 458–61 (2006); Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 272–75 
(1992). For cases applying the legislative intent framework, see Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 137; 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 702–05 (2011); Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. 
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 765–69 (2004). For cases applying the common law framework, see 
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419–22 (2011); Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New 
York, 559 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2010). 
 208. See Anza, 547 U.S. at 463–79 (Thomas, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
Justice Thomas directly attacked the Court’s use of policy factors to arrive at the meaning 
of proximate cause, arguing that the mere fact that it is difficult to ascertain the amount of 
damages or that it is unnecessary for deterrence are not proper reasons for the Court to 
determine that proximate cause is not satisfied. Id. at 466. Justice Thomas claimed that the 
statute itself was the proper source to draw upon for the meaning of proximate cause and 
that the majority’s failure to do so led to an erroneous result because “civil RICO 
plaintiffs that suffer precisely the kind of injury that motivated the adoption of the civil 
RICO provision will be unable to obtain relief.” Id. at 475. In essence, Justice Thomas was 
arguing for application of the legislative intent framework the Court had adopted only two 
years prior in Department of Transportation. 
 209. CSX Transp., 564 U.S. at 705–06 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The dissent framed its 
analysis by quoting language from Staub—where the Court had applied the common law 
framework—that “[w]hen Congress creates such a federal tort, ‘we start from the premise 
that Congress adopts the background of general tort law.’” Id. at 706 (quoting Staub, 562 
U.S. at 417). Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that Congress had not included language in 
FELA expressly indicating that it was abrogating common law principles of proximate 
cause, and, thus, the common law applied. See id. at 708. He then summarized the various 
common law formulations of proximate cause. Id. at 719. Without selecting among them 
or providing guidance for the lower courts to do so, the Chief Justice maintained that 
these standards should dictate the meaning of proximate cause under the statute. Id. 
 210. Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 23–24 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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more appropriate framework in one statutory context but legislative 
intent or common law is more appropriate in another. An analysis of 
Staub and CSX Transportation, released within a mere three-and-a-
half months of one another, is illustrative. In Staub, the Court 
imported common law standards for the meaning of proximate cause 
without explaining why it adopted that framework rather than 
considering the legislative intent or policy factors.211 The Court simply 
asserted the common law standards and applied them to the facts at 
issue, never considering or in any way addressing policy or the 
legislative intent around proximate cause.212 Less than four months 
after the release of Staub, however, the Court expressly disavowed 
the blind application of the common law in CSX Transportation, 
emphasizing “the lack of consensus on any one definition of 
‘proximate cause.’”213 The Court made no mention of its contrary 
approach in Staub or to the fact that it had not found the lack of 
consensus problematic in that context.214 Turning a blind eye to this 
discord, the Court performed an analysis of the legislature’s intended 
meaning of proximate cause.215 
The dissent in CSX Transportation criticized the majority’s 
legislative intent approach and argued for the application of a 
common law framework.216 However, the dissent put forth no 
principled reasoning for why this particular framework was the most 
appropriate one, merely quoting from Staub that, “[w]hen Congress 
creates such a federal tort, ‘we start from the premise’ that ‘Congress 
adopts the background of general tort law.’”217 The dissenting Justices 
ignored the fact that the Court, many times in opinions they had 
joined, had taken a variety of approaches to determine the meaning 
of proximate cause. Justice Kennedy, for example, who joined the 
CSX Transportation dissent,218 had been part of the majority in 
Department of Transportation, which embraced precisely that 
framework––legislative intent––against which he now voiced his 
 
 211. Staub, 562 U.S. at 419 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§	435, 
435B (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
 212. Id. at 419–20. 
 213. CSX Transp., 564 U.S. at 701–02 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, 
§	41, at 263). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 704–05. 
 216. Id. at 705–06 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 217. Id. at 706 (quoting Staub, 562 U.S. at 417). 
 218. Id. at 705. 
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opposition.219 In CSX Transportation, he simply endorsed the 
dissenting opinion’s view that common law proximate cause standards 
“suppl[y] the vocabulary” for determining the meaning of the 
concept.220 Three years after CSX Transportation, the Court again 
applied the legislative intent framework in Lexmark, but in that case 
the opinion was unanimous, with the Justices who dissented in CSX 
Transportation joining the majority.221 Once again, the Court 
provided no reasoning for why it chose to employ that particular 
framework. 
The vacillation in frameworks, indeed, cannot be explained as 
merely a function of the Court’s composition. The individual Justices 
appear to have no fidelity to one particular framework over any 
other: Justice Scalia signed onto both the common law and legislative 
intent frameworks, and Justices Ginsburg, Thomas, Breyer, and 
Kennedy have endorsed all three within a period of only a few 
years.222 Thus, the inconsistency in the Court’s approaches is not a 
 
 219. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 755, 768 (2004) (discussing the 
legislative purposes for the statute at issue). 
 220. CSX Transp., 564 U.S. at 719 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Proximate cause 
supplies the vocabulary for answering such questions. It is useful to ask whether the injury 
that resulted was within the scope of the risk created by the defendant’s negligent act; 
whether the injury was a natural or probable consequence of the negligence; whether 
there was a superseding or intervening cause; whether the negligence was anything more 
than an antecedent event without which the harm would not have occurred.”). 
 221. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in CSX 
Transportation. See id. at 705. All four Justices then joined the majority in Lexmark. See 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 120 (2014). 
 222. Justice Scalia authored the unanimous opinion in Lexmark, which utilized the 
legislative intent framework, and joined the dissent in CSX Transportation, which 
advocated for the common law framework. See id. at 120; CSX Transp., 564 U.S. at 705 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg authored CSX Transportation, which 
illustrated the legislative intent framework, joined the majority in Staub, which used the 
common law framework, and joined the majority in Anza, in which the Court relied on the 
public policy framework. See CSX Transp., 564 U.S. at 688; Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 
U.S. 411, 412 (2011); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 452 (2006). Justice 
Thomas joined the opinion in Lexmark, which utilized the legislative intent framework, 
joined in part of the majority in CSX Transportation, which advocated for the common 
law framework, and joined the majority in Holmes, which used the public policy 
framework. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 120; CSX Transp., 564 U.S. at 687; Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r 
Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 260 (1992). Justice Breyer joined the majorities in Lexmark and 
Staub, which relied on the legislative intent and common law frameworks respectively, and 
concurred in Anza, where the Court utilized the public policy framework. Lexmark, 572 
U.S. at 120; Staub, 562 U.S. at 412; Anza, 547 U.S. at 479. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent in 
Anza, but it was based on different grounds. See Anza, 547 U.S. at 479 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy authored the majority in Anza, 
which utilized the public policy framework and joined the majorities in Lexmark, which 
used the legislative intent framework, and Staub, which used the common law framework. 
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 120; Staub, 563 U.S. at 412; Anza, 547 U.S. at 452. 
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reflection of competing views among the Justices about the 
appropriate way to address proximate cause in statutory claims; the 
analytical allegiances of the individual Justices appear to be just as 
fluid. 
The availability of three analytical frameworks in precedential 
parity instead serves as a mechanism for the Court to reach outcomes 
desired on independent grounds. The Court can pick its preferred 
outcome and then reach it based on whichever of the three 
frameworks will provide the strongest justification. Indeed, when the 
Court deviates from its prior framework, it usually does so to reach a 
standard or outcome that conflicts with the result it would have 
reached had it applied the prior analytical structure. For example, in 
Department of Transportation, the Court employed a legislative intent 
framework even though it had most recently applied a public policy 
framework in Holmes.223 Applying the legislative intent framework, 
the Court concluded that proximate cause was not satisfied under 
NEPA because recognizing liability for the chain of causation at issue 
would not fulfill NEPA’s purposes.224 However, had the Court 
considered policy factors, as it had in Holmes, it quite likely would 
have had to reach a different outcome. Allowing suit for the plaintiff’s 
alleged injury would not have introduced speculation into the 
proceedings nor would it have required the Court to craft 
complicated rules to avoid duplicative damages.225 It also would not 
have opened the door to “massive and complex damages litigation.”226 
These policy factors all would have weighed in favor of recognizing 
proximate cause, and, thus, had the Court applied a public policy 
framework, it would have surely found proximate cause. The Court, 
however, shifted its approach. 
 
 223. See Dep’t of Transp., 541 U.S. at 767–69; Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268–70. 
 224. Dep’t of Transp., 541 U.S. at 769. 
 225. NEPA’s requirement that an administrative agency produce an EIS whenever it is 
promulgating a regulation that will cause an “environmental effect” has nothing to do with 
speculation. The Court’s concern was in fact the opposite of speculation––it knew that the 
regulation at issue would have an environmental effect and was concerned that 
recognizing proximate cause would be futile because the agency would be bound to issue 
the regulation regardless of the outcome of the EIS. Id. at 769–70. Moreover, duplicative 
damages are inapposite to the NEPA provision at issue—the provision only provides for 
injunctive relief in the form of obligating the agency to produce the EIS. See id. at 756–57, 
769–70. 
 226. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 274 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. 
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983)). Again, damages are not available 
under the NEPA provision at issue, and, thus, the policy concern that a finding of liability 
will lead to massive and complex damages litigation is inapplicable. See Dep’t of Transp., 
541 U.S. at 763 (noting that the Court was deciding whether or not to set aside an agency’s 
decision to prepare an EIS). 
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Similarly, in Anza, the Court applied a public policy framework 
but likely would have reached a different result had it employed the 
legislative intent framework as it had in the case most immediately 
prior, Department of Transportation. In Anza, the Court considered 
whether the defendant corporation, a competitor of the plaintiff 
corporation, proximately caused the plaintiff to lose sales by engaging 
in unlawful business conduct (specifically, failing to pay state taxes 
and submitting fraudulent tax returns) in violation of RICO.227 The 
Court concluded that it would not be appropriate to recognize 
proximate cause because of the difficulty of ascertaining the precise 
damages attributable to the defendant’s violation, the “speculative 
nature of the proceedings that would follow,” and because the more 
immediately injured victim—in this case, the State of New York––
could be counted on to sue.228 However, had the Court performed a 
legislative intent analysis, it would have asked whether recognizing 
the defendant’s conduct as a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries 
would advance RICO’s purposes and most certainly would have had 
to answer that question in the affirmative.229 Indeed, as Justice 
Thomas pointed out in his dissent, the plaintiff’s injuries “are 
precisely those that Congress aimed to remedy through the 
authorization of civil RICO suits”: competitive injuries resulting from 
organized crime.230 Thus, under the legislative intent framework, the 
Court most likely would have found proximate cause satisfied. 
However, employing a different analytical framework, the Court 
reached a contrary result. 
The same phenomenon is evident in the Court’s decision to apply 
the legislative intent framework in CSX Transportation after adopting 
the common law framework in the prior two statutory proximate 
cause cases.231 As the majority itself acknowledged, application of the 
common law standards for proximate cause would have led to a 
different outcome.232 The Court’s announced standard for proximate 
cause under FELA, whether the “negligence played a part—no 
matter how small—in bringing about the injury,” expressly deviated 
 
 227. Anza, 547 U.S. at 457–58. 
 228. Id. at 459–60. 
 229. See id. at 474–75 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id. at 463, 457. 
 231. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011); Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of 
New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010). 
 232. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 705 (2011) (noting that use of “stock 
proximate-cause” language might mislead the jury away from the standard Congress 
intended). 
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from common law formulations.233 The Court declared the “legislative 
purpose” of Congress in enacting FELA was to “loosen constraints 
on recovery,” and, therefore, “there is little reason for courts to hark 
back to stock judge-made proximate-cause formulations.”234 
The instability in the Court’s statutory proximate cause analysis 
came to a head in Bank of America, where the Court attempted to 
incorporate all three frameworks into its analysis—completing the 
loop back to Associated General Contractors—but was left unable to 
arrive at any substantive standard for proximate cause under the 
FHA.235 The Court first imported the language from Lexmark, used 
there to frame a legislative intent analysis, that “[p]roximate-cause 
analysis is controlled by the nature of the statutory cause of action. 
The question it presents is whether the harm alleged has a sufficiently 
close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.”236 The Court 
then, however, embraced a common law framework and stated that 
various common law formulations are applicable.237 The Court 
meanwhile noted that the proximate cause standard the Eleventh 
Circuit had announced, foreseeability, “would risk ‘massive and 
complex damages litigation.’”238 Despite the application of all three 
frameworks, the Court’s analysis led to no concrete definition of 
proximate cause under the FHA.239 
IV.  SCOPE OF LIABILITY FRAMEWORK 
As documented in Parts II and III, the Court’s simultaneous 
endorsement of three inconsistent analytical frameworks to 
determine the meaning of proximate cause in statutory claims has 
given rise to a body of case law marked by inconsistency and 
 
 233. Id. (“[I]t is not error in a FELA case to refuse a [jury instruction] embracing stock 
proximate-cause terminology.”). 
 234. Id. at 702–03. 
 235. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) (“The parties 
have asked us to draw the precise boundaries of proximate cause under the FHA and to 
determine on which side of the line the City’s financial injuries fall. We decline to do so.”). 
 236. Id. at 1305 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 
U.S. 118, 133 (2014)). 
 237. Id. at 1306 (“[P]roximate cause ‘generally bars suits for alleged harm that is “too 
remote” from the defendant’s unlawful conduct.’ .	.	. [P]roximate cause under the FHA 
requires ‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged.’” (first quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133; and then quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r 
Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992))). 
 238. Id. (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983)). 
 239. Id. (inviting the lower courts to “define, in the first instance, the contours of 
proximate cause under the FHA”). 
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indeterminacy.240 Statutory proximate cause standards and outcomes 
are doctrinally unjustified, and the jumbled precedent leaves lower 
courts with inadequate guidance to determine the meaning of 
proximate cause in new statutory contexts. To settle the deep 
incoherence in statutory proximate cause doctrine, this part proposes 
that the Supreme Court and lower courts embrace a single, structured 
analytical framework to determine the meaning of proximate cause in 
statutory claims. Specifically, this part argues that courts should 
uniformly apply the “scope of liability framework,”241 as articulated in 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, to determine the meaning of 
proximate cause under a given statutory cause of action. 
This part proceeds in four subsections. The first subsection 
describes the scope of liability framework as set forth in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts and outlines the analysis it would require 
in a statutory context. The second subsection argues that the scope of 
liability framework appropriately anchors the determination of 
proximate cause in the statutory scheme. It argues that the scope of 
liability framework prevents the Court from engaging in improper 
judicial policymaking and thereby avoids the serious flaws of the 
public policy framework. The third subsection contends that the 
scope of liability framework is also superior to the common law 
framework because it is more likely to produce consistent and 
predictable proximate cause standards and outcomes. Finally, the 
fourth subsection explains why scope of liability is a more optimal 
framework than the Court’s existing legislative intent framework. 
A. The Scope of Liability Framework 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts wholly replaces the term 
proximate cause with the phrase “scope of liability.”242 This 
definitional shift roots the concept of proximate cause in the notion 
that negligent conduct causes a series of harms, and only some of 
those harms fall within the scope of liability that the law is willing to 
recognize.243 The framing has echoes of Judge Andrews’s dissent in 
Palsgraf—that proximate cause is essentially about how far the court 
decides to extend liability—but is accompanied by a more structured 
 
 240. While pure doctrinal determinacy in any area of law is likely illusory, and there 
may be strong reasons such a goal is undesirable, heightened doctrinal indeterminacy 
raises serious concerns of judicial illegitimacy. See Allen, supra note 19, at 125–29. 
 241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§	29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. §	29 cmt. a. 
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analysis for making that determination.244 Under a scope of liability 
framework, “[a]n actor’s liability is limited to those physical harms 
that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”245 
The reporters term this inquiry the “scope of the risk” test.246 The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts explains the test: 
When defendants move for a determination that plaintiff’s 
harm is beyond the scope of liability as a matter of law, courts 
must initially consider all of the range of harms risked by the 
defendant’s conduct that the jury could find as the basis for 
determining that conduct tortious. Then the court can compare 
the plaintiff’s harm with the range of harms risked by the 
defendant to determine whether a reasonable jury might find 
the former among the latter.247 
Thus, the scope of liability in a tort claim is based on the scope of the 
risks underlying the determination of negligence.248 
 
 244. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting). 
 245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM §	29. Both prior Restatements stated that legal cause required the showing of two 
elements: (1) the actor’s conduct is a “substantial factor in bringing about the harm,” and 
(2) there is “no principle or rule of law which restricts the actor’s liability because of the 
manner in which the act or omission operates to bring about such invasion.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	9 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965); accord 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL HARMS TO PERSONS, LAND, AND CHATTELS 
§	9 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
 246. The test is also known as the “risk standard.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §	29 cmt. d. The test is effectively the 
same as “the risk rule” coined by Robert Keeton in his classic book on proximate cause. 
ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 9–10 (1963); see also 
Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1253 (summarizing section 29 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts and Keeton’s book). 
 247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§	29 cmt. d. Jane Stapleton observes that the “scope of the risks” inherently derives from 
the normative concerns that underlie the recognition of the actor’s conduct as tortious. See 
Jane Stapleton, The Risk Architecture of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 44 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1309, 1327 (2009) [hereinafter Stapleton, Risk Architecture] (“Only by an 
explicit link back to the complex normative reasons courts give (or should be giving) to 
explain the contours, the ‘normative envelope,’ of the relevant ‘special relationship’ giving 
rise to the duty will the Restatement (Third) user understand which are the risks that made 
the actor’s conduct tortious and therefore how to apply the perimeter scope rule.”). 
 248. Note that the Restatement (Third) of Torts proposes an even broader standard for 
the scope of liability in intentional and reckless torts. Section 33 of the Restatement, Scope 
of Liability for Intentional and Reckless Tortfeasors, states: 
(a) An actor who intentionally causes harm is subject to liability for that harm 
even if it was unlikely to occur. 
(b) An actor who intentionally or recklessly causes harm is subject to liability for 
a broader range of harms than the harms for which that actor would be liable if 
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The quintessential example provided to illustrate the application 
of the scope of the risk test is that of a parent who gives a child a 
loaded gun, which the child then drops on the foot of the plaintiff, 
causing injury.249 To determine whether this injury falls within the 
scope of liability, a court would identify the proscriptive rule—do not 
give a child a loaded gun—and ask what risks it was intended to 
prevent.250 A court would answer that handing a child a loaded gun is 
tortious because of the risk that the child will shoot the gun and 
thereby injure or kill someone.251 Thus, while one could establish that 
the parent was negligent in giving the child the gun, the harm caused 
by the child dropping the gun on the plaintiff’s foot would not be 
actionable because it does not fall within the scope of the risk that 
made the conduct negligent.252  
The Restatement (Third) of Torts explains the reasoning 
underlying this framework. The scope of liability framework “imposes 
limits on liability by reference to the reasons for holding an actor 
liable for tortious conduct in the first place.”253 It goes on to state that 
“[t]he risk standard appeals to intuitive notions of fairness and 
proportionality by limiting liability to harms that result from risks 
created by the actor’s wrongful conduct, but for no others.”254 While 
the scope of liability framework overlaps in certain respects with an 
approach based on foreseeability, it ultimately provides a narrower 
and more focused inquiry: only those foreseeable injuries that formed 
the basis for declaring the conduct tortious are within the scope of 
 
only acting negligently. In general, the important factors in determining the scope 
of liability are the moral culpability of the actor, as reflected in the reasons for and 
intent in committing the tortious acts, the seriousness of harm intended and 
threatened by those acts, and the degree to which the actor’s conduct deviated 
from appropriate care. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsections (a) and (b), an actor who intentionally or 
recklessly causes harm is not subject to liability for harm the risk of which was not 
increased by the actor’s intentional or reckless conduct. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §	33; see 
also id. §	33 cmt. a (“[T]he scope of liability for intentional and reckless tortfeasors should 
be broader than for negligent or strictly liable tortfeasors.”). 
 249. See Stapleton, Risk Architecture, supra note 247, at 1324. 
 250. See, e.g., id. (discussing that the father’s wrongful conduct was the “loadedness of 
the gun,” which risked the child accidentally shooting someone, not dropping it on 
someone’s toe). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§	29 cmt. e. 
 254. Id. 
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liability. Thus, in the gun example, although it may be foreseeable 
that the child would drop the gun, injuries caused from dropping the 
gun would never fall within the scope of liability because they are not 
among the risks the rule was enacted to prevent. 
In the statutory context, courts applying the scope of liability 
framework would perform the scope of the risk test by asking what 
class of harms the legislature intended to address when it enacted the 
statutory prohibition at issue. Courts would seek to discern the 
purpose of the statutory prohibition and, more specifically, what types 
of harmful outcomes the prohibition was designed to prevent or 
minimize by employing the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation. Thus, through textualist methodologies, courts would 
gain insight into the scope of the risks based on statutory provisions 
that, for example, indicate the types of injuries that the statute was 
intended to address.255 Similarly, through intentionalist 
methodologies, courts would look to the legislative history to 
determine the harms the statutory prohibition was meant to prevent 
or minimize.256 Like in common law tort claims, the outcome of the 
scope of the risk test would determine the scope of liability, i.e., the 
standard for proximate cause. 
B. Avoidance of Improper Judicial Legislation 
The scope of liability framework is the optimal framework for 
proximate cause analysis because it properly anchors the analysis in 
the statutory scheme. As Sandra Sperino has correctly observed in 
her discussions of statutory proximate cause, when the legislature 
enacts a statutory prohibition, it conceives of a web of rights and 
duties that form “interlocking liability limits.”257 The scope of liability 
framework provides an elegant analytical tool for discerning a 
proximate cause standard that aligns with those limits. The 
 
 255. For example, a civil statute outlawing the sale of guns to minors might provide 
that its purpose is to prevent needless gun violence and that any individual who has been 
injured by a minor’s improper use of a gun may sue. Such provisions would indicate that 
the risks the statute is designed to prevent are gun violence by minors and resulting injury. 
 256. For example, in the fictitious civil statute described in note 255, supra, the 
legislative history may include statements by congressional sponsors describing the deaths 
and physical injuries resulting from shootings by minors. It may also include debates about 
whether allowing victims or their estates to sue will help reduce such deaths and injuries. 
Perhaps, however, it includes no mention whatsoever of the financial or emotional harms 
that are experienced by family members of the victims. The latter version of history would 
serve as a strong indication that the statute was not designed to address this particular risk 
of youth gun violence, i.e., the financial and emotional injury to the family members of 
victims, and thus, liability should not extend to those individuals. 
 257. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 8, at 1200. 
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framework reflects the intuitive sensibility that, where the legislature 
has enacted a statute with the goal of minimizing or eliminating a 
particular harm, we can and should assume that the legislature 
intended for liability to extend where a defendant’s violation of the 
statute in fact caused that harm to occur. In other words, in the 
absence of statutory text that supplies the standard for proximate 
cause, the best proxy for the legislature’s intent regarding the “ripples 
of harm” that are recoverable under the statute are the ripples that 
Congress sought to address.258 
Conversely, it is improper for the Court to apply independent 
policy analysis in determining the proper limit for recoverability 
against the backdrop of a statutory scheme. The Court’s independent 
views about the difficulty in crafting damages rules or the need to 
promote deterrence have no proper role in determining a statute’s 
proximate cause standard where the legislative intent regarding that 
standard is discernible.259 To allow otherwise would violate core 
separation of powers principles.260 If the statutory scheme requires 
courts to craft complicated rules to apportion damages, for example, 
 
 258. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) (“A 
violation of the FHA may, therefore, ‘be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow’ far 
beyond the defendant’s misconduct.” (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. 
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983))). 
 259. The well-established principle of legislative supremacy provides that courts are 
subordinate to legislatures in all nonconstitutional areas of policymaking. See Daniel A. 
Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 281–82 
(1989) (“It is a commonplace that, apart from constitutional issues, judges are subordinate 
to legislatures in the making of public policy. If this subordinate role means anything at all, 
it must somehow constrain judges who interpret statutes from implementing their own 
notions of public policy.”). Although differing views about the meaning and significance of 
legislative supremacy lead to varying approaches to statutory interpretation, no theory of 
legislative supremacy supports the independent application of policy factors where the 
legislative intent regarding an open question of statutory interpretation is discernible. See 
Edward O. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 1129, 1141 (1992); Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative 
Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767, 780–81 (1991) (analyzing different statutory 
interpretation frameworks with regard to their relationship to legislative supremacy). 
 260. The rule of legislative supremacy, see supra note 259, derives from the 
constitutional separation of powers. Legislative supremacy constrains courts from 
imposing their own policy preferences on statutes, holding that Congress is authorized by 
the Constitution to act as the primary maker of laws and policy, and thus, where Congress 
has resolved a legal or policy question, courts are “obligated to respect the legislature’s 
decision” so long as that decision is constitutional. Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down 
of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 209, 241 (2015); see also Farber, supra note 259, 
at 292 (“When statutory language and legislative intent are unambiguous, courts may not 
take action to the contrary. In other words, when legislation clearly embodies a collective 
legislative understanding, the court must give way, even if its own view of public policy is 
quite different.”). 
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it is likely the legislature’s intent that courts do so.261 The fact that the 
task may be difficult does not give courts permission to decline to 
allow such suits to go forward nor does it relieve them of their 
obligation.262 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Holmes highlighted precisely 
this limitation on the judiciary’s interpretative authority, citing recent 
Supreme Court precedent that held that where Congress enacts a 
statute providing a private right of action for damages, courts are 
bound to administer the statute regardless of whether they agree with 
its wisdom.263 Judges cannot interpret damages provisions to be more 
limited than a statute provides because of the challenges involved in 
administration—such an interpretative reach by the judiciary would 
represent a serious encroachment on the legislature’s power.264 
Similarly, a court’s independent judgment regarding deterrence—the 
extent to which it is necessary to allow suits to go forward to deter 
prohibited conduct—has no proper role in setting limits on liability 
where the statute’s structure and purpose already reflect those 
limits.265 No theory of statutory interpretation supports an approach 
to the determination of proximate cause that so clearly flies in the 
face of separation of powers principles.266 
Moreover, where the legislative intent surrounding the 
limitations on liability is ambiguous, courts do not gain authority to 
 
 261. Even the “weakest” notions of legislative supremacy involve judicial deference to 
the text and purpose of a statute. See William N. Eskeridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory 
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1065 (1989) (“[I]f the text and legislative history 
support one interpretation, public values analysis cannot displace it. In many cases, the 
public values presumptions operate as ‘tiebreakers’ in the close cases, where there are 
good textual and legislative history arguments for different interpretations.”). Yet even 
when the case is not close, the doctrine of legislative supremacy does not permit courts to 
look beyond the statute in the first instance to determine statutory meaning. See Farber, 
supra note 259, at 284. 
 262. See Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 285 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“[I]f Congress had legislated the elements of a private cause of action for 
damages, the duty of the Judicial Branch would be to administer the law which Congress 
enacted; the Judiciary may not circumscribe a right which Congress has conferred because 
of any disagreement it might have with Congress about the wisdom of creating so 
expansive a liability.” (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748 
(1975))). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See supra notes 259–60. 
 265. See supra notes 259–60. 
 266. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353 (1990) (articulating a practical reasoning 
model of statutory interpretation premised on the “hierarchy of sources,” which shows the 
statutory text, specific and general legislative history, and legislative purpose as more 
authoritative than “current policy”). 
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abandon the statute entirely and set a standard based on what would 
be convenient to implement or on what they judge as good policy. 
Rather, separation of powers principles require courts to determine 
the standard for proximate cause that most closely aligns with the 
overall statutory scheme.267 Policy concerns may be relevant, but they 
still must be rooted in the statute—the extent to which the legislature 
was concerned about deterrence or avoiding duplicative recovery, for 
example—rather than the judiciary’s independent views on those 
issues. The Court’s public policy framework ignores these 
constitutional concerns altogether and treats the proximate cause 
determination as if it is capable of being understood in a vacuum, 
when in fact, a statute’s legislative purpose provides relevant 
limitations on the extent of harm that is recoverable.268 
Finally, it bears mentioning that concerns about speculation and 
the ability to ascertain the precise amount of damages attributable to 
the unlawful conduct need not be addressed by proximate cause 
because they are already accounted for in other judicial rules. As 
described in Part II, causation encompasses two separate elements: 
factual cause and proximate cause. The factual causation requirement 
already protects defendants from recovery for speculative claims.269 
To satisfy factual cause, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury 
would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct and, 
moreover, that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the injury.270 Thus, to the extent a plaintiff’s claim is 
speculative because the plaintiff cannot establish that the injury is in 
fact attributable to the unlawful conduct rather than to some other 
intermediate cause, the plaintiff would not be able to satisfy factual 
causation.271 Requiring proximate cause to provide that same 
 
 267. See supra notes 259–60. 
 268. See Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 8, at 1247 (“To date, courts 
have approached [proximate cause questions] casually and without recognizing that 
statutory proximate cause raises important concerns related to separation of powers and 
the interaction of the common law with statutes.”). 
 269. Proximate cause doctrine is heavily criticized for often mistakenly incorporating 
elements of factual causation. See Michael D. Green, The Intersection of Factual Causation 
and Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 680–81 n.31 (2006); Sperino, Statutory Proximate 
Cause, supra note 8, at 1223; Stapleton, Legal Cause, supra note 19, at 967. 
 270. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014). 
 271. See Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992) (“[T]he less direct 
an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff’s damages 
attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent factors.”); id. at 272–73 
(“If the nonpurchasing customers were allowed to sue, the district court would first need 
to determine the extent to which their inability to collect from the broker-dealers was the 
result of the alleged conspiracy to manipulate, as opposed to, say, the broker-dealers’ poor 
business practices or their failures to anticipate developments in the financial markets.”); 
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protection is unnecessary and also blurs the important distinction 
between the two causation requirements. 
Other safeguards against speculative claims are found in the 
rules of civil procedure. Chiefly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) requires “[f]actual allegations [to] be enough to raise a right 
to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the 
complaint’s allegations are true.”272 To satisfy this standard, a 
complaint’s allegations must include statements of fact that entitle the 
plaintiff to relief, and those statements must not be merely “labels 
and conclusions.”273 Rule 12(b)(6) is thus expressly crafted to provide 
relief (in the form of a dismissal) where the plaintiff’s allegations are 
speculative in nature; proximate cause need not serve the very same 
function.274 And where borderline speculative allegations survive a 
challenge at the pleading stage, other safeguards exist at the level of 
proof: to prevail on a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate facts that 
meet the “preponderance of the evidence” threshold for relief and 
must establish specific damages.275 
The scope of liability framework properly anchors proximate 
cause analysis in the statutory scheme and, in doing so, restrains 
courts from engaging in the type of improper judicial legislation 
inherent in the public policy framework.276 The scope of the risk test 
requires courts to discern the legislative goals underlying the statutory 
prohibition at issue, and the line that is drawn for proximate cause, 
i.e. the scope of liability, is then a function of the legislature’s goals. 
The test thus leaves little leeway for courts to deviate from the 
 
see also Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 460 (2006) (asserting that 
proximate causation is meant to prevent “intricate, uncertain inquiries”). 
 272. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6). 
 273. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  
 274. In Anza, for example, the Court’s concern that the plaintiff merely asserted that 
the injury alleged (i.e., loss of sales) resulted from the defendant’s conduct (i.e., lowering 
of prices) without factual statements showing this to be true falls precisely within the set of 
concerns addressed by Rule 12(b)(6) and could have been dismissed under that standard 
without entangling the proximate cause standard. See Anza, 547 U.S. at 458–59. 
 275. See id. at 466 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §	912 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)) (“Proximate cause and certainty of damages, while 
both related to the plaintiff’s responsibility to prove that the amount of damages he seeks 
is fairly attributable to the defendant, are distinct requirements for recovery in tort.”). 
 276. Note that the arguments set forth here are meant only to apply to the 
determination of statutory proximate cause. When a court is determining the meaning of 
proximate cause under a given statute, it is engaging in statutory interpretation and, 
therefore, engaging in independent policy analysis would be improper. In contrast, when 
courts are setting the meaning of proximate cause in common law claims, independent 
policy judgments may well have a proper role in the analysis. 
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statutory framework, let alone to rewrite the statute based on their 
own views of public policy. Instead, the standard for proximate cause 
that emerges from this analysis is expressly linked to “the reasons the 
law has for imposing the obligation on the particular defendant in the 
first place” and is necessarily consistent with the overall statutory 
scheme.277 
C. Benefits of Scope of Liability Framework for Doctrinal 
Determinacy 
The scope of liability framework is also beneficial because it 
enhances doctrinal determinacy.278 It does so by detaching statutory 
proximate cause analysis and outcomes from the traditional common 
law formulations. Application of common law standards engenders 
doctrinal indeterminacy for two principal reasons: there is no settled 
common law standard for proximate cause, and the available common 
law standards have ambiguous meanings.279 By rooting the proximate 
cause analysis in the statute, the scope of liability avoids this 
indeterminacy. 
First, as described in detail in Section II.A, the common law 
framework leads to doctrinal indeterminacy because there is no 
consensus on the standard for proximate cause in common law tort 
doctrine.280 Common law formulations include, among others, 
directness; foreseeability; the immediate or nearest antecedent test; 
the efficient, producing cause test; the substantial factor test; and the 
probable, or natural and probable, consequence test.281 The lack of a 
 
 277. Stapleton, Legal Cause, supra note 19, at 997. 
 278. This enhanced doctrinal determinacy does not come at the expense of judicial 
flexibility. The scope of the risk test provides a framework that guides judicial reasoning 
but does not dictate a particular outcome in any given factual scenario. 
 279. See Haley, supra note 19, at 148 (“[P]roximate cause, which never has been a 
precise legal concept, recently has become a dangerously weak doctrine.”). 
 280. See supra Section II.A. 
 281. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 701 (2011). Very recently, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals spelled out in express terms the absence of a uniform 
proximate cause standard: 
Proximate cause is an infamously nebulous concept that the Court has explained is 
meant to serve as a generic label for “the judicial tools used to limit a person’s 
responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own acts.” Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
268 .	.	. see also Paroline v. United States, .	.	. 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2014) (“The 
idea of proximate cause, as distinct from actual cause or cause in fact, defies easy 
summary.”); United States v. Galan, 804 F.3d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 2015) (“As the 
Court demonstrated, the phrase ‘proximate cause’ hides (or encompasses) 
interpretive problems of its own.”). We recognize that foreseeability is another of 
the ‘judicial tools’ in the proximate cause toolshed. See Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 12 
.	.	.	. 
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settled common law standard means the Court cannot draw upon the 
common law as the source of meaning for proximate cause without 
doing so in a manner marked by arbitrariness. That is, because it is 
unsettled whether the common law test for proximate cause is 
foreseeability, directness, or something else, the Court cannot justify 
the importation of one or a combination of these standards as “the” 
common law standard on a purely doctrinal basis.282 To the contrary, 
the wide range of standards available under the common law allows 
the Court, where it professes reliance on the “common law,” to 
simply pick and choose among the standards based on its preferences 
in any given statutory context. There is no independent doctrinal 
reason to explain why any particular standard should be applied 
rather than any other based on the common law. Thus, application of 
the common law framework is inherently arbitrary and facilitates 
inconsistency.283 
Second, application of the common law does not help determine 
the meaning of whichever common law standard the Court has 
selected. As described in Section II.A, the meaning of common law 
proximate cause standards are both contested and notoriously 
flexible. It is disputed, for example, whether the directness standard 
restricts proximate cause to only those consequences which are direct 
consequences of the conduct and, thus, excludes indirect 
consequences that are foreseeable, or whether directness serves to 
expand proximate cause to encompass both foreseeable harms and 
harms that are unforeseeable but direct.284 But even if the definitions 
 
Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739, 747 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 282. See, e.g., Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 12 (2010) (“The 
concepts of direct relationship and foreseeability are of course two of the ‘many shapes 
[proximate cause] took at common law .	.	.	.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Holmes v. 
Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992))). 
 283. For example, in Hemi Group, the Court declared that the proximate cause 
requirement under RICO “should be evaluated in light of its common-law foundations” 
and “thus requires ‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious 
conduct alleged.’ A link that is ‘too remote,’ ‘purely contingent,’ or ‘indirec[t]’ is 
insufficient.” Id. at 9 (alteration in original) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271, 274). In 
Staub, however, the Court added another test to the common law standard: whether the 
intervening cause may be deemed a “superseding” cause of the harm. Staub v. Proctor 
Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 420 (2011). 
 284. Compare W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, §	42, at 273 (stating that under 
the directness theory of proximate causation, liability extends both to “all ‘direct’ (or 
‘directly traceable’) consequences and those indirect consequences that are foreseeable”), 
and Stapleton, Legal Cause, supra note 19, at 996–97 (“The directness rule extends to all 
outcomes, even if not foreseeable, so long as they are the ‘direct’ result of the tortious 
conduct. .	.	.	[T]he foreseeability rule generates a narrower scope of liability.”), with Bank 
of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) (“We conclude that the 
Eleventh Circuit erred in holding that foreseeability is sufficient to establish proximate 
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were settled, “directness,” “foreseeability,” and other proximate 
cause formulations, such as “natural and foreseeable consequence,” 
have no settled meaning.285 As scholarship, treatises, and courts 
frequently observe, these formulas are “empty metaphysical 
concepts,”286 which are unable to direct courts’ analyses in any 
meaningful way.287 Foreseeability “provides no definite guidance for 
decision” because “almost anything is foreseeable, given enough time 
and incentive to project possible consequences .	.	.	.”288 Directness, 
similarly, can expand or contract seemingly at a court’s will. Indeed, 
as the discussion in Section II.B demonstrates, the Supreme Court has 
at times interpreted “directness” as necessarily preclusive of multistep 
causal chains and at other times has found a multistep chain to be 
“direct.”289 Thus, even once a common law standard is selected, that 
standard provides insufficient guidance to determine the substantive 
meaning of proximate cause.290 The result, again, is arbitrariness and 
inconsistency. 
The scope of liability framework avoids the problems of 
doctrinal indeterminacy inherent in the common law framework by 
divorcing proximate cause analysis from the muddled common law 
doctrine.291 The scope of liability framework has no allegiance to 
these preexisting standards and instead determines the meaning of 
proximate cause based on the limitations contemplated by the 
legislature. This mode of analysis facilitates doctrinal determinacy. 
The determination of a statute’s scope of risks, while likely subject to 
debate, requires justification through the traditional tools of statutory 
 
cause under the FHA. .	.	.	[F]oreseeability alone does not ensure the close connection that 
proximate cause requires. .	.	. Rather, proximate cause under the FHA requires ‘some 
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’” (quoting 
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268)). 
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 90–92. 
 286. Kelley, supra note 19, at 98. 
 287. See id.; Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 8, at 1238 (noting that the 
lack of a uniform standard for proximate cause allows “courts [to] apply any meaning they 
see fit, whether the meaning comports with the underlying statute or not”); Stapleton, 
Legal Cause, supra note 19, at 969 (“[I]n disputes presented as concerning the nature of 
the consequence of which a complaint is made, the vacuity of the mere assertion of an 
outcome being ‘too remote’ or ‘not proximate’ is patent, especially in cases where the 
effect is instantaneous and spatially very near.”). 
 288. Kelley, supra note 19, at 92. 
 289. See supra notes 108–21 and accompanying text. 
 290. See Stapleton, Legal Cause, supra note 19, at 975 (emphasizing “[t]he inadequacy 
of causal [language] as a guide to attribution of responsibility in legal disputes”). 
 291. For an in-depth discussion of the term “doctrinal determinacy,” which broadly 
refers to the extent to which application of a legal doctrine produces predictable and 
internally consistent case outcomes, see generally Allen, supra note 19. 
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interpretation.292 The scope of liability, i.e., the proximate cause 
standard, flows directly from this determination. The resulting 
standards are internally consistent because each reflects the outcome 
of this analysis and aligns consistently with the statutory scheme of 
which it is a part. 
D. Scope of Liability as a Framework for Doctrinal Coherence 
The scope of liability framework also provides a more doctrinally 
coherent and operationally practical structure as compared to the 
Court’s existing legislative intent framework. The legislative intent 
framework, although anchored in the statutory purpose much like the 
scope of liability, contains little analytical structure and therefore fails 
to produce predictable and doctrinally consistent standards for 
proximate cause. In each of the three cases in which the Court has 
applied a legislative intent framework––Department of 
Transportation, CSX Transportation, and Lexmark––it has analyzed 
the statutory purpose from a different angle. In Department of 
Transportation, the Court looked to the “underlying policies” of the 
statute and the general purposes of the statutory provision at issue to 
determine the standard for proximate cause.293 The Court asked 
whether recognizing proximate cause in the particular set of 
circumstances presented by the case would advance those purposes, 
and its answer to that question determined the proximate cause 
standard.294 In CSX Transportation, however, the Court directly 
inquired into the legislature’s intention regarding proximate 
causation.295 The Court asked what degree of causation between the 
conduct and the harm Congress intended to be sufficient for recovery 
under the statute.296 It analyzed this question by interpreting the 
statutory language regarding causation as well as the legislative 
history.297 The Court then used the outcome of this analysis as the 
 
 292. Legislative intent is of course frequently contested and often elusive. However, 
the range of disagreement between competing interpretations is confined to disagreement 
regarding the meaning of legislative history. In the common law framework, the range of 
disagreement is potentially unbounded and eludes logical debate––it is simply unsettled 
whether the proper standard for proximate cause is foreseeability, directness, both, or 
something else entirely, and there are no clear principles underlying the disagreement. See 
generally id. 
 293. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004). 
 294. Id. at 768–69 (noting that the “legally relevant cause .	.	. is not the [agency’s] 
action, but instead the actions of the President”).  
 295. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 702–03 (2011).  
 296. Id. at 705.  
 297. Id. at 702–05. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 529 (2019) 
2019] THE PROXIMATE CAUSE STANDARD 581 
basis for the proximate cause standard under the statute.298 Yet in 
Lexmark, the Court looked neither to the broad legislative purpose 
nor to Congress’s intended standard for proximate cause but instead 
to the types of injuries that Congress meant to be recoverable under 
the statute.299 The Court determined the particular types of injuries 
for which Congress intended to provide recovery under the statute 
and then set a standard for proximate cause that reflected the chain(s) 
of causation necessary to link the conduct to those injuries.300 
In sum, with the legislative intent framework, the Court arrives 
at a proximate cause standard based on the congressional purpose 
underlying the statute. However, what specifically the Court is 
looking to when it determines that purpose is inconsistent. The scope 
of liability framework provides structure to this inquiry by focusing 
the Court’s legislative intent analysis on the “scope of the risks” the 
legislature was addressing when it enacted the statutory prohibitions 
at issue. This inquiry is the optimal one for three principal reasons. 
First, it logically follows that, where Congress enacted a statutory 
prohibition with the goal of minimizing or eliminating a particular 
risk, it intended for plaintiffs to be able to recover when a violation of 
the statute in fact caused that risk to come to pass. Imagine, for 
example, a statute that prohibits parents with minor children from 
leaving guns in unlocked locations in their homes. The legislative 
history demonstrates that the statute was enacted to prevent deaths 
and injuries from youth gun violence, which, the legislature believed, 
were in part the result of minors having easy access to guns from their 
parents, which minors then shared or sold to others in their social 
networks (or used on their own). The statute includes only general 
causal language providing that persons injured by a violation of the 
statute may sue. It stands to reason that the legislature intended for 
the estate of a decedent to recover where the decedent’s death 
resulted from a minor having access to an unlocked gun, which is a 
violation of the statute, and then sharing or selling that gun with 
others. That scope of the risks—deaths or injuries made possible by 
youth access to guns—is what the legislature intended to provide 
recovery for, and, thus, the standard for proximate cause under the 
statute should follow accordingly. 
 
 298. Id. at 705. 
 299. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 133–34 
(2014). 
 300. Id. 
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Second, the scope of liability framework is practically 
operational in a way that the Court’s legislative intent framework, as 
applied in CSX Transportation in particular, is not. The CSX 
Transportation analysis relies on the availability of legislative history 
or statutory language indicating precisely what degree of causation is 
required under the statute to make out a claim. But such history is 
rarely available. In most of the statutes in which the Court has 
interpreted the meaning of proximate cause, the statutory language 
regarding causation is vague and ambiguous, providing only, for 
example, that persons whose injuries are “caused by” or “caused by 
reason of” a violation of the statute may sue.301 This language lacks 
sufficient specificity to translate into a meaningful standard for 
proximate cause. Moreover, the legislative history is often silent on 
the degree of causation required to make out a claim under the 
statute. In Holmes, for example, the Court first attempted to 
determine the meaning of proximate cause under RICO by discerning 
the legislature’s intended purpose behind the statutory language 
“‘injured’ by reason of” a violation of the statute.302 The only insight 
the Court was able to glean from the legislative history was that the 
language in RICO was modeled after the language in the Clayton 
Act, and that language was borrowed from the Sherman Act.303 
Notwithstanding the analytical problems with importing that 
interpretation to RICO, the insight proved insufficient to determine 
the meaning of proximate cause under RICO because the common 
law standard was and is unsettled.304 The Court thus turned to the 
public policy framework for the meaning of proximate cause.305 
The Court’s analysis in Holmes illustrates the shortcomings of 
the version of the legislative intent framework adopted in CSX 
Transportation: the framework depends on the existence of legislative 
history or statutory language that speaks directly to the causation 
question at issue, and statutes and their histories are often silent in 
this regard. The scope of liability framework, by contrast, relies on 
the existence of legislative history that is likely to be accessible, 
 
 301. See, e.g., id. at 122 (analyzing the statutory language “cause” or “likely to cause”); 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004) (analyzing the statutory 
language “affecting”); Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265 (1992) 
(analyzing the statutory language “by reason of”). 
 302. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §	1964(c) (2012)). 
 303. Id. at 267–68. 
 304. Id. at 268–70. 
 305. Id. at 272–74. 
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namely, the harmful outcomes that a particular statutory prohibition 
was intended to prevent or minimize.306 
Third, the structure of the scope of liability framework ensures 
that the resulting proximate cause standards are properly tailored to 
comport with the statutory purpose. In this way, the scope of liability 
framework overcomes the problems in the Court’s analysis in 
Department of Transportation. There, the Court determined the 
meaning of proximate cause under the statute by broadly asking 
whether deeming the conduct at issue a proximate cause would 
further the general purposes of the statutory prohibitions.307 This 
inquiry is so broad that it risks creating overly inclusive proximate 
cause standards that do not comport with the true intentions of 
Congress. Statutes often have very broad general purposes such as to 
“end gun violence” or to “promote affordable housing,” and it would 
be faulty to assume that Congress intended to allow liability to extend 
wherever doing so would advance these goals. The scope of liability 
framework appropriately narrows the inquiry by shifting courts’ 
attention to the specific class of harms motivating the passage of the 
statutory provision at issue. 
The scope of liability framework, as articulated in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, is thus the optimal framework to 
determine the meaning of proximate cause in statutory claims when 
compared with other commonly used frameworks. By grounding 
courts’ analyses in the scope of the risks the legislature intended to 
prevent when it enacted the statute at issue, the framework avoids 
improper judicial policymaking, promotes doctrinal determinacy, and 
ensures adherence to the genuine legislative intent. 
 
 306. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2042 
(2006) (reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006)) 
(“Federal judges will decide the meaning of statutory language in light of .	.	. the statute’s 
legislative history, especially as it pertains to statutory purpose(s) and the compromises 
made .	.	.	.”); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 673, 674 (1997) (“For more than a century, the Supreme Court has relied on the 
legislative history accompanying a statute to determine legislative ‘intent’ in cases of 
statutory ambiguity.”). There are, of course, credible arguments that a statute’s purpose 
can never be accurately determined because of the reality of the legislative process. See 
David A. Strauss, The Plain Language Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 651, 655–56, 655 n.26 
(2016) (noting that a general problem with arguments that invoke the purpose of a statute 
is that “no statute pursues a single purpose; there are always cross-cutting purposes”). See 
generally Gerald C. Mac Callum, Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966) (outlining 
a variety of objections to the notion that legislative intent is accurately discoverable 
through statutory interpretation). 
 307. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768–70 (2004). 
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V.  APPLYING THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY FRAMEWORK TO THE FAIR 
HOUSING ACT 
 This part returns to Bank of America and applies the scope of 
liability framework to determine the meaning of proximate cause 
under the FHA. As discussed in Section IV.A, the analysis begins 
with an inquiry into the scope of the risks the statutory prohibitions 
are designed to prevent or minimize. The FHA broadly prohibits 
discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, national origin, and disability.308 These prohibitions are 
contained in three sections of the statute. Section 3604 prohibits 
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, including any conduct 
that makes unavailable or creates less favorable terms or conditions 
for the sale or rental of housing.309 Section 3605 prohibits 
discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions.310 
Specifically, it prohibits discrimination in mortgage lending and in the 
provision of other forms of financial assistance for the purchasing or 
maintenance of residential properties.311 It further prohibits 
discrimination in residential property appraisals.312 Section 3606 
prohibits discrimination in the provision of brokerage services.313 
To determine the risks motivating Congress’s enactment of these 
prohibitions, this part provides an extensive analysis of the statute’s 
 
 308. When Congress initially enacted the FHA in 1968, it prohibited discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub L. 
No. 90-284, §	804, 82 Stat. 73, 83 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	3604 (2012)). Sex was 
added as another protected characteristic in 1974. Housing and Community Development 
Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, sec. 808(b)(1), §	804, 88 Stat. 633, 729 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	3604 (2012)). In 1988, Congress amended the FHA to extend its 
protections to individuals with disabilities and to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
family status. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, sec. 
6(b)(1), §§	804, 806, 102 Stat. 1619, 1622 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§	3604, 3606 
(2012)).  
 309. 42 U.S.C. §	3604 (2012). The Amendments Act, as codified, further prohibits 
discrimination in advertisements and in representations regarding the property and 
neighborhood. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub L. No. 90-284, §	804(c), 82 Stat. 83 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	3604(c) (2012)). It also includes a prohibition against a refusal 
to permit reasonable accommodations for handicapped persons. Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988, §	804, 102 Stat. at 1620–21. 
 310. 42 U.S.C. §	3605. 
 311. Id. §	3605(a)–(b)(1). 
 312. Id. §	3605(b)(2). 
 313. Id. §	3606 (“[I]t shall be unlawful to deny any person access to or membership or 
participation in any multiple-listing service, real estate brokers’ organization or other 
service, organization, or facility relating to the business of selling or renting dwellings, or 
to discriminate against him in the terms or conditions of such access, membership, or 
participation, on account of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national 
origin.”). 
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legislative history. The focus of this part is the legislative history 
because the statutory text itself contains few clues regarding the scope 
of the risks Congress intended to address. The introductory provision 
of the Act states that it is the policy of the FHA “to provide, within 
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United 
States.”314 The Supreme Court has held that this language is “broad 
and inclusive” and thus should be given a “generous construction.”315 
However, the statutory text provides no indication of the specific risks 
the FHA is aimed to remedy.316 Likewise, the statutory definition of 
“aggrieved person,” which delineates who has the right to sue, is 
broad but not precise. An “aggrieved person” is defined as “any 
person .	.	. who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory 
housing practice.”317 The phrase “injured by” connotes loose 
restrictions on recovery but, again, fails to lend specific insight into 
what types of injuries Congress had in mind when it enacted the 
statute.318 
The legislative history reveals that the FHA was enacted with 
ambitious social and economic aims—in the language of the scope of 
liability framework, the scope of the risks it was intended to prevent 
was wide. Generally speaking, the FHA was passed to address the 
impacts of housing discrimination. This sentiment is embodied in 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) Secretary Robert 
Weaver’s statement to the Senate committee debating the bill that 
“[i]n order to understand fully the need for a national policy against 
discrimination in housing and the enactment of a comprehensive 
Federal fair housing law, it is well to look into the results of housing 
discrimination.”319 
And, indeed, Congress did so.320 The congressional debates and 
other legislative documents reflect that Congress was concerned 
about a web of consequences flowing from housing discrimination 
 
 314. Id. §	3601. 
 315. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972). 
 316. See id. at 209–11. 
 317. 42 U.S.C. §	3602(i)(1) (2012). 
 318. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 702–03 (2011). 
 319. Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Before the S. 
Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 
35 (1967) [hereinafter “Fair Housing Act Hearings”] (statement of Robert C. Weaver, 
Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development). 
 320. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (discussing the physiological impact of 
racial discrimination in the housing market); 113 CONG. REC. 22,848 (1967) (describing 
the impact of discriminatory housing on access to education and job opportunities). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 529 (2019) 
586 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
and that it expected the FHA to prevent or minimize these 
consequences in the future. 
One strand of the web of consequences Congress recognized 
relates to the individual-level harms resulting from experiences of 
discrimination. The drafters of the FHA were acutely aware that 
minority populations facing discrimination in the housing market are 
denied economic opportunity––they are unable to purchase a home in 
a more prosperous neighborhood or to access resources that would 
allow them to improve their economic situation—and that this lack of 
access creates economic immobility.321 The second strand of harms 
Congress intended to address relates to the impacts of discrimination 
experienced at a societal level. Statements in the legislative debates 
repeatedly emphasized that housing discrimination resulted in 
segregation, which fueled the growth of urban decay and slums. 
Congress understood that slums, in turn, cause a range of social 
problems and impose a financial burden on cities.322 Congress saw the 
FHA as a solution to these ills.323 
The individual-level harms are described in subsection (A). The 
societal harms are described in subsection (B) (residential segregation 
and urban decay), subsection (C) (social problems), and subsection 
(D) (financial burden). Subsection (E) summarizes the outcome of 
the scope of the risks test and describes the scope of liability standard 
that results. 
A. Scope of the Risks: Individual-Level Harms and the Lack of 
Economic Mobility 
The injustices faced by individuals who directly experienced 
discrimination were often the first reason cited for the passage of the 
FHA.324 Witnesses and legislators described these injustices as both 
psychological and economic. Senator Walter Mondale, who was a 
cosponsor of the Senate bill that became the FHA, repeatedly 
 
 321. See infra notes 326–40 and accompanying text. 
 322. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 22,848 (1967) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings) 
(explaining that discriminatory housing practices had a negative impact on education and 
job opportunities); see also Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 180 (prepared 
statement of Algernon D. Black, on behalf of the ACLU). 
 323. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale) 
(“[F]air housing is one more step toward achieving equality in opportunity and education 
.	.	.	.”). 
 324. See Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 178 (statement of Sen. Walter F. 
Mondale, Member, Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs (quoting statement of Algernon 
D. Black, on behalf of the ACLU)); id. at 36 (statement of Robert M. Weaver, Secretary, 
Department of Housing & Urban Development). 
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discussed the emotional impact of housing discrimination. He 
described this impact as “the degradation and humiliation suffered by 
a man in the presence of his wife and children—when he is told that 
.	.	. he is just not good enough to live in a white neighborhood.”325 
During three-day hearings about the bill before the Subcommittee on 
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency (“Committee”), he drew attention to other witnesses’ 
testimony that reflected this impact. Senator Mondale repeated for 
emphasis the statement of Algernon Black, speaking on behalf of the 
ACLU, that “[d]eeper than the material and physical deprivation is 
the humiliation and rejection and what this does to human being 
[sic].”326 The executive director of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), Roy Wilkins, likewise 
testified that “[o]ne of the burning frustrations Negro residents carry 
with them in city ghettos is the knowledge that even if they want to 
and have the means to do so, very often they cannot get out.”327 
In addition to the psychological impacts, Congress was intensely 
focused on preventing the economic immobility that results from 
racial discrimination.328 Indeed, economic mobility was the first 
objective Senator Mondale mentioned when he summarized the goals 
of the FHA on the eve of its passage.329 “First,” he implored, “fair 
housing is one more step toward achieving equality in opportunity 
and education for the Negro.”330 Senator Joseph Tydings likewise 
expressed this sentiment in his statement that housing discrimination 
“unjustly denies many Americans the freedom to gain access on equal 
terms with other Americans to good housing and good schools for 
their children, and proximity to good jobs. Such exclusion unjustly 
denies many Americans of an equal opportunity to better their 
 
 325. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale). 
 326. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 178 (statement of Sen. Walter F. 
Mondale, Member, Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs (quoting statement of Algernon 
D. Black, on behalf of the ACLU)); see also id. at 28 (statement of Ramsey Clark, Att’y 
Gen. of the United States) (testifying that fair housing was “psychologically most 
important”). 
 327. Id. at 98 (statement of Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and Chairman, 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); see also id. at 179 (statement of Algernon D. 
Black, on behalf of the ACLU) (depicting minority populations as experiencing 
frustration and rage from being trapped in a “cage” in urban ghettos). 
 328. See, e.g., id. at 28 (statement of Ramsey Clark, Att’y Gen. of the United States) 
(“[T]his law on the books, effectively enforced, can really provide opportunities in 
significant numbers and .	.	. it will make it much, much easier to achieve equality.”). 
 329. 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale). 
 330. Id. 
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lives.”331 The congressional debates reflect Congress’s focus on three 
specific mechanisms by which it understood housing discrimination to 
paralyze economic mobility for nonwhite individuals: preventing 
moves closer to job opportunities, limiting opportunities for home 
ownership, and creating de facto segregation in schools and thus 
fewer educational opportunities. 
First, Congress and the Committee repeatedly discussed the 
inability of African Americans to follow the movement of 
employment opportunities to the suburbs due to housing 
discrimination.332 Data was cited at the Committee hearings showing 
that job opportunities were increasingly being located in suburban 
areas rather than in the core of cities.333 Meanwhile, nonwhite 
populations were concentrated in metropolitan areas.334 In Congress’s 
view, this spatial isolation was a direct product of housing 
discrimination and resulted in massive unemployment in the 
ghettos.335 HUD Secretary Robert Weaver testified: “The high rate of 
unemployment in racial ghettos, particularly in the case of nonwhites, 
also demonstrates the evils resulting from housing discrimination. 
Housing discrimination deprives hundreds of thousands of nonwhites 
of employment opportunities in suburban communities which are 
 
 331. 113 CONG. REC. 22,848 (1967) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings). 
 332. Id. (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong) (“[T]he system of segregated housing disables 
our society. It often has led to the creation of deplorable slum conditions in which many of 
our citizens are too poorly educated, inadequately trained, and ill equipped to become 
productive members of a society .	.	.	.”); see also Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 
319, at 36 (statement of Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, Department of Housing & Urban 
Development). 
 333. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 36 (statement of Robert C. Weaver, 
Secretary, Department of Housing & Urban Development) (“Between 1960 and 1965 
from one-half to two-thirds of all new factories, stores, and other mercantile buildings in 
all sections of the country, except the South, were located outside the central cities of 
metropolitan areas.”). 
 334. Id. (“[Eighty] percent of the nonwhite population in metropolitan areas in 1967 
lives in central cities .	.	.	.”). 
 335. See id. at 46 (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale, Member, Subcomm. on Hous. 
& Urban Affairs); id. at 77 (statement of Frankie M. Freeman, Comm’r, United States 
Commission on Civil Rights); id. at 219 (statement of Edward Rutledge, Executive 
Director, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing) (“These [U.S. 
Department of Labor] reports show that unemployment is so much worse in the slum 
ghettos than in the country as a whole.”); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, STANDARD 
METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS: NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, BY SEX, COLOR, AND AREA, MARCH 1966 (1966), as reprinted in 
Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, tbl.G; Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 
319, at 305 (listing the “NCDH Bill of Particulars Submitted to the White House April 22, 
1966”). 
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generally unavailable to them as residential areas.”336 Similar 
testimony was reiterated throughout the Committee hearings.337 Thus, 
it is clear from the hearings and congressional debates that the impact 
of housing discrimination on employment opportunities was a key 
motivation underlying the passage of the FHA. 
Second, Congress understood discrimination in the housing 
market to hinder minorities’ economic prospects by making 
homeownership all but unavailable to them. Senator Vance Hartke 
testified regarding the lack of mortgage financing available to 
nonwhites, which acted as a “major deterrent” to their ability to 
obtain homeownership, particularly in the suburbs.338 Other witnesses 
at the Committee hearings explained in detail the ways in which 
African Americans had long been shut out of homeownership 
opportunities. U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark opened the 
hearings by describing how, until 1947, the federal government 
encouraged and often required racially restrictive covenants in deeds 
where federal mortgage insurance or guarantees were sought.339 Until 
1948, he further explained, courts enforced private restrictive racial 
covenants.340 Other witnesses testified that lending institutions 
 
 336. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 36 (statement of Robert C. Weaver, 
Secretary, Department of Housing & Urban Development). Secretary Weaver went on to 
explain the necessity of fair housing for improvement of minorities’ employment 
prospects, stating that “[u]nless nonwhites are able to move into suburban communities by 
the elimination of housing discrimination .	.	. they are going to be deprived of many jobs, 
because they will be unable to live in the central city and work in the suburbs because of 
the high cost of transportation.” Id. at 36–37; see also id. at 219 (statement of Edward 
Rutledge, Executive Director, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing) 
(“[N]ew employment in commerce, industry, construction, and services has tended to 
locate in suburban and outlying sections of metropolitan areas, where for largely racial 
reasons, Negroes have not been permitted to live.”); id. at 104 (statement of Roy Wilkins, 
Executive Director, NAACP, and Chairman, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights). 
 337. See, e.g., id. at 103 (statement of Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and 
Chairman, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights) (“The suburbs are often far removed 
from the residences of Negroes, who are unable to live near places of potential 
employment.”); id. at 239 (prepared statement of Edward Rutledge, Executive Director, 
National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing) (“We know of no statistics that 
reveal the relationship between housing segregation and racial disadvantage as clearly as 
those that relate to employment and unemployment in urban areas.”). 
 338. Id. at 328 (statement of Sen. Vance Hartke); see also id. at 38 (statement of 
Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, Department of Housing & Urban Development). 
 339. Id. at 6 (statement of Ramsey Clark, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (discussing 
the federal government’s failure to ensure equal protection prior to 1948 by encouraging 
racially motivated zoning and restrictive covenants). 
 340. Id. (statement of Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, Department of Housing & Urban 
Development); see also id. at 78 (statement of Frankie M. Freeman, Comm’r, United 
States Commission on Civil Rights) (“Until 1947, discrimination against Negroes was a 
condition of FHA assistance.”); id. at 128 (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale, Member, 
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refused to make loans to African Americans to purchase homes in 
white neighborhoods,341 and senators noted that minorities were 
expressly left out of the post-World War II housing boom as a result 
of discriminatory policies.342 
Third, the legislative history reflects Congress’s intent that the 
FHA would address the impacts of housing discrimination on 
educational opportunities, which further hindered minorities’ 
economic prospects. In urging for the passage of the FHA, Senator 
Hiram Fong repeatedly emphasized that the lack of fair housing 
maintains school segregation, preventing African Americans from 
attaining educational, and thus economic, opportunity.343 The 
testimony of numerous witnesses at the Committee hearings echoed 
this view.344 Reverend Robert Drinan, Dean of Boston College Law 
School, for example, testified that, if an African American “cannot 
purchase a home outside of his present neighborhood, then the 
guarantees that have been given to him for .	.	. equal opportunity for 
his children in education are often rendered impossible of 
attainment.”345 The effects of housing discrimination on educational 
opportunity and associated economic opportunity were of paramount 
 
Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs) (“[Y]esterday the U.S. Civil Rights Commission 
testified that until 1947 FHA required racial covenant[s] in the deeds of property where 
they were insuring the mortgage.”). 
 341. See, e.g., id. at 181 (prepared statement of Algernon D. Black, on behalf of the 
ACLU). 
 342. 113 CONG. REC. 22,848 (1967) (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 77, 79 (statement of Frankie M. 
Freeman, Comm’r, United States Commission on Civil Rights); id. at 119 (statement of 
Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and Chairman, Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights); id. at 129 (statement of Reverend Robert F. Drinan, Dean, Boston College 
Law School); id. at 133 (statement of Jefferson Fordham, Dean, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School); id. at 187 (statement of Q.V. Williamson, President, National 
Association of Real Estate Broker’s, Inc.); id. at 189 (statement of Leon Cox, Jr., 
Executive Director, National Association of Real Estate Broker’s, Inc.); id. at 222 
(statement of Edward Rutledge, Executive Director, National Committee Against 
Discrimination in Housing). 
 345. Id. at 129 (statement of Reverend Robert F. Drinan, Dean, Boston College Law 
School). Frankie M. Freeman, Commissioner of the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, testified about a recent report published by the Commission, Racial Isolation in the 
Public Schools, which demonstrated a relationship between the confinement of minorities 
to urban ghettos and inferior educational opportunities. Id. at 79 (statement of Frankie M. 
Freeman, Comm’r, United States Commission on Civil Rights). She explained that for this 
reason the Commission’s recommendations in this report included a federal fair housing 
law. Id. HUD Secretary Weaver also drew attention to this report, remarking that it 
“established conclusively the relationship between poor housing in racial ghettos and the 
lack of educational opportunities.” Id. at 36 (statement of Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, 
Department of Housing & Urban Development). 
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importance to the legislature and were core motivations underlying 
the passage of the bill that became the FHA.346 
This section demonstrates that the psychological and economic 
impacts on individuals who experienced discrimination were among 
the key “risks” the FHA’s prohibitions were intended to prevent. 
Congress believed that passage of the FHA would minimize or 
eliminate these effects to the extent that they were caused by housing 
discrimination. 
B. Scope of the Risks: Residential Segregation and Urban Decay 
Next, the legislative history reveals that the FHA was intended 
to address residential segregation and the urban slums resulting from 
such segregation. The FHA was enacted following President 
Kennedy’s issuance of an executive order prohibiting discrimination 
in federally funded housing, which listed the elimination of residential 
segregation as one of its stated goals.347 Congress saw the FHA as a 
bolder and stronger version of the executive order that would do a 
better job of achieving its objectives.348 Senator Edmund Muskie 
described the goal of residential integration underlying the FHA as 
“the heart of the matter.”349 Senator Mondale remarked, “[T]he 
system of segregated housing disables our society.”350 Testimony 
during the Committee hearings repeatedly emphasized that 
segregation was the product of discrimination, not individual choices 
or economics.351 The FHA was described as a policy that would 
confront “the problem of residential segregation and its attendant 
evils.”352 It would “stimulate Americans of all races and colors to 
 
 346. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale) 
(describing fair housing as “one more step toward achieving equality in opportunity and 
education” for African Americans). 
 347. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. §	652 (1959–1963).  
 348. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 20–21 (statements of Ramsey Clark, 
Att’y Gen. of the United States, and Sen. Walter F. Mondale, Member, Subcomm. on 
Hous. & Urban Affairs). 
 349. 113 CONG. REC. 22,847 (1967) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie). 
 350. Id. at 22,848 (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong). 
 351. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 78 (statement of Frankie M. 
Freeman, Comm’r, United States Commission on Civil Rights) (“[H]ousing patterns have 
developed along the lines of rigid racial segregation. These patterns have not developed 
through the accumulation of independent choices by individual home seekers, nor can 
they be explained entirely by differentials in the income levels of whites and Negroes. To a 
large extent, housing patterns have been imposed upon home seekers—white and 
nonwhite––without regard to individual choice and without regard to ability to pay.”). 
 352. 113 CONG. REC. 37,038 (1967) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale). 
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learn to live together”353 and would reflect “the principle that we are 
going to live together and not separately.”354 
The legislative debates and committee hearings reflect 
Congress’s understanding of the direct links between segregation and 
urban slums. In the concise and direct words of Senator Mondale, 
“the system of segregation .	.	. has led to the creation of deplorable 
slum conditions .	.	.	.”355 HUD Secretary Weaver devoted a portion of 
his lengthy testimony at the Committee hearings to the “results of 
housing discrimination.”356 The first result he discussed was the 
emergence of “racial ghettos.”357 He described how millions of 
African Americans who migrated from the South to the North were 
forced to live in circumscribed urban areas because of 
discrimination.358 These areas inevitably turned into racial ghettos, 
where poverty, overcrowding, and poor housing conditions were 
rampant.359 He explained the impossibility of eliminating urban 
poverty without enacting fair housing legislation: open housing is 
necessary to decrease densification, which is a prerequisite to 
“restor[ing] these areas so they will no longer be ghettos but they will 
be attractive places” to live.360 The revitalization of America’s cities, 
 
 353. Id. at 22,847 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie). 
 354. Id. at 37,038 (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale). Pushing for cloture on the 
bill, Senator Mondale repeatedly underscored that the FHA would spur integration. 114 
CONG. REC. 2692 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale) (“Mr. President, the 
Senate has been involved for some days in a discussion of .	.	. the question of whether we 
will decide once and for all to prohibit deeply imbedded patterns of segregated living in 
America .	.	.	.”). At congressional debates less than two months before the bill’s passage, 
he implored Congress that, “[i]f America is to escape apartheid we must begin now, and 
the best way for this Congress to start on the true road to integration is by enacting fair 
housing legislation.” Id. at 3422. 
 355. 113 CONG. REC. 22,848 (1967) (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong). 
 356. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 35–37 (statement of Robert C. 
Weaver, Secretary, Department of Housing & Urban Development). 
 357. Id. at 40 (“There is, unfortunately, a great deal of assertion today that you either 
do something about the ghetto or you don’t do anything about it, that you either are 
concerned with open occupancy or you are concerned with fixing up the ghetto, and that 
these things are mutually inconsistent one with the other. Nothing could be further from 
the truth.”). 
 358. Id. at 35–36. Later testimony at the hearings included frequent reference to the 
fact that ghettos were deliberately created by discriminatory government policies. See, e.g., 
id. at 101 (statement of Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and Chairman, 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights) (“It must be remembered that the northerns, the 
northern cities deliberately created the ghetto.”). 
 359. Id. at 36 (statement of Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, Department of Housing & 
Urban Development). 
 360. Id. at 40. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 529 (2019) 
2019] THE PROXIMATE CAUSE STANDARD 593 
he repeatedly emphasized, depended on the enactment of fair 
housing legislation.361 
The goal of eliminating urban decay was front and center in the 
congressional debates on the FHA.362 The Act was passed on the 
heels of President Johnson’s speech on “the crisis of the cities.”363 The 
word “crisis” was used over twenty-six times during the Committee 
hearings to describe the urban problems that the FHA intended to 
address.364 The terms “slums” and “ghettos” were likewise invoked 
 
 361. Id. at 37 (“And of central importance, the enactment of this bill would help 
surmount one of the basic barriers to the revitalization of our cities.”); id. at 40 (“[Y]ou 
cannot even talk about revitalizing the areas of non-white concentration without 
envisioning an equal opportunity so that these people can move out into other places, as 
they will have to move if you are going to be successful in your attack on the ghetto.”). 
 362. The following statement typifies the nature of the testimony given at the 
committee hearings: 
The great urban crisis which confronts us calls for comprehensive programs of 
immense proportions. The focus of greatest need and concern is the slum or 
ghetto. The problems such areas present cannot be dealt with effectively in 
isolation. The extirpation of slum conditions in a given area will not meet the 
social need unless the intensity of use for residential purposes in the area is greatly 
reduced for the future and the people displaced can obtain good housing 
elsewhere. In short, a broad openhousing [sic] policy that is given vitality in 
practice is essential to the effective relief of slum conditions. 
Id. at 133 (statement of Jefferson B. Fordham, Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School). Testimony by Edward Rutledge serves as a further example. Mr. Rutledge 
excoriated that, “[i]f we look at our great cities, the most striking fact is that precisely 
because the total housing market is segregated, the ghetto has continued and will continue 
to expand the area of physical blight and human hopelessness in the city.” Id. at 233 
(prepared statement of Edward Rutledge, Executive Director, National Committee 
Against Discrimination in Housing). 
 363. 114 CONG. REC. 3953 (1968) (statement of Rep. Bill Barrett).  
 364. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 4 (statement of Ramsey Clark, 
Att’y Gen. of the United States); id. at 37 (statement of Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, 
Department of Housing & Urban Development); id. at 76–77, 83, 85 (statements of 
Frankie M. Freeman, Comm’r, United States Commission on Civil Rights); id. at 98, 102, 
108 (statements of Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and Chairman, Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights); id. at 120 (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale, Member, 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Urban Affairs); id. at 133 (statement of Jefferson B. Fordham, 
Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law School); id. at 214, 219, 243 (statements and 
prepared statement of Edward Rutledge, Executive Director, National Committee 
Against Discrimination in Housing); Memorandum of Law on the Constitutionality of 
Federal Fair Housing Legislation from Edward Rutledge & Jack E. Wood, Jr. to 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., in Fair Housing Act 
Hearings, supra note 319, at 252; NAT’L COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUS., 
HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUILDS GHETTOS (1967), reprinted in Fair Housing 
Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 284, 286, 312; Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, 
at 415 (statement of Kennon V. Rothchild, Past Chairman, Minnesota State Commission 
Against Discrimination); id. at 430, 432 (statements of James H. Harvey, American 
Friends Service Committee).  
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repeatedly. Indeed, each and every one of the forty-eight witnesses 
who spoke in favor of the FHA at the Committee hearings discussed 
the goal of eliminating urban slums.365 In the words of HUD Secretary 
Weaver, “The rebuilding of our cities .	.	. cannot be successful unless 
we eliminate all forms of discrimination .	.	.	.”366 Following the 
Committee hearings, Representative Carl Albert described to 
Congress that the purpose of the FHA was “to eliminate the ghetto 
itself.”367 While Congress was clear that it did not view the FHA as a 
“panacea” for urban decay, the history reveals that the drafters 
considered it a “necessary prerequisite”: “an indispensable part of 
th[e] total effort” towards the revitalization of America’s cities.368 
Thus, Congress understood segregation and urban decay as risks 
imposed (and indeed, ones that had come to pass) by housing 
 
 365. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 27 (statement of Ramsey 
Clark, Att’y Gen. of the United States); id. at 36–38 (statement of Robert C. Weaver, 
Secretary, Department of Housing & Urban Development); id. at 79 (statement of 
Frankie M. Freeman, Comm’r, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights); id. at 108 (statement of 
Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and Chairman, Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights); id. at 127 (statement of Reverend Robert F. Drinan, Dean, Boston College 
Law School); id. at 133 (statement of Jefferson B. Fordham, Dean, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School); id. at 179 (prepared statement of Algernon D. Black, on behalf 
of the ACLU); id. at 207 (statement of Gerard A. Ferere, Professor of French and 
Spanish, St. Joseph’s College); id. at 238 (prepared statement of Edward Rutledge, 
Executive Director, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing); id. at 348 
(statement of John C. Williamson, Legislative Counsel, Realtors’ Washington Commission 
of National Association of Real Estate Boards); id. at 363 (statement of Rabbi Jacob 
Rudin, President, Synagogue Council of America); id. at 385 (statement of George Meany, 
President, AFL-CIO); id. at 398 (statement of Fred Kramer, Real Estate Panel, Chicago); 
id. at 497 (prepared statement of Whitney M. Young, Jr., Executive Director, National 
Urban League).  
 366. Id. at 38 (statement of Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, Department of Housing & 
Urban Development). 
 367. 113 CONG. REC. 24,084 (1967) (statement of Rep. Carl Albert). Senator Mondale 
likewise remarked on the eve of the bill’s passage that with fair housing “the rapid, block-
by-block expansion of the ghetto will be slowed and replaced by truly integrated and 
balanced living patterns.” 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. 
Mondale). Congress was concerned about “ghetto living” in part due to the belief that it 
was inciting urban riots and giving fodder to black extremist groups. See Fair Housing Act 
Hearings, supra note 319, at 28 (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale, Member, Subcomm. 
on Hous. & Urban Affairs) (“[I]t seems to me that one of the biggest arguments that we 
give to the black racists is the existence of ghetto living.”). 
 368. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 26–27 (statements of Sen. John 
Sparkman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs; Ramsey Clark, Att’y Gen. of 
the United States; and Sen. Walter F. Mondale, Member, Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban 
Affairs); see also id. at 48 (statement of Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, Department of 
Housing & Urban Development) (“[W]ithout this proposal I don’t think the total effort 
[towards eliminating the ghettos] can be successful.”); id. at 107–08 (statement of Roy 
Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and Chairman, Leadership Conference on Civil 
Rights).  
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discrimination. One of Congress’s principal goals in enacting the 
FHA was to eliminate or minimize these risks. 
C. Scope of the Risks: Social Costs of Slums 
Congress well recognized that the web of consequences that 
flowed from housing discrimination did not end with segregation and 
the existence of urban slums. The legislative history shows that 
Congress was particularly concerned with the social consequences of 
urban decay, including “inferior public education, recreation, health, 
sanitation, and transportation services and facilities.”369 Senators 
repeatedly emphasized these effects during the congressional 
debates.370 
Discussions about the social costs of slums often particularly 
emphasized overcrowding and poor housing conditions.371 Senator 
Mondale described legalized discrimination in housing as “forc[ing] 
millions of Americans to live on top of one another in abject poverty 
in the ghettos and slums .	.	.	.”372 This argument was made repeatedly 
throughout the Committee hearings.373 Poor housing quality and its 
 
 369. 113 CONG. REC. 22,848 (1967) (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong). The Department 
of Justice, in explaining the basis for constitutionality of the FHA, stated that in ghettos 
“the benefits of government are less available.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL HOUSING LEGISLATION UNDER THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE [hereinafter FEDERAL HOUSING 
LEGISLATION], in Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 9. Citing data on racial 
isolation and urban poverty, Senator Fong described that ghettos have adverse effects on 
education and housing conditions. 113 CONG. REC. 22,848 (1967) (statement of Sen. 
Hiram Fong). 
 370. Id. (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings) (“The presence of residential ghettos––in 
effect, restricted areas in which all members of a minority group are forced to reside no 
matter where they desire or can afford to live––brings gravely damaging social 
consequences to our country, particularly in our urban areas.”). Senator Case articulated 
the causal chain: “unequal housing, resulting from discriminatory and closed housing 
policies, contributes to the intolerable conditions of life in many of this Nation’s greatest 
urban areas.” Id. at 22,844 (statement of Sen. Clifford Case). He then went on to specify 
that these conditions include “segregated overcrowding living conditions, inherently 
unequal schools, unemployment and underemployment, appalling mortality and health 
statistics.” Id. 
 371. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 78 (statement of Frankie 
Freeman, Comm’r, United States Commission on Civil Rights) (describing housing in the 
urban ghettos as “overcrowded, exorbitantly priced, and often unsound”). 
 372. 113 CONG. REC. 22,845 (1967) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale). Senator 
Fong likewise discussed how the lack of fair housing leads to significant overcrowding in 
urban centers, pointing out that in Harlem, density was 100 people per acre. Id. at 22,848 
(statement of Sen. Hiram Fong). 
 373. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 77 (statement of Frankie 
M. Freeman, Comm’r, United States Commission on Civil Rights) (testifying at length 
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spillover effects were similarly often discussed.374 A 1959 Report of 
the United States Commission on Civil Rights, submitted into the 
Record of the Committee hearings, cited census data showing that 
“the housing of nonwhite families is consistently of poorer quality and 
more overcrowded than that of white households,” even though 
nonwhite families paid more for their homes in terms of prices or 
rent.375 In Senator Mondale’s final summary of the goals underlying 
the legislation, he argued directly against whites’ “fears of 
integration” by pointing out the unfairness inherent in restricting 
minorities to “the oldest and least-desirable housing.”376 
The history reflects that eliminating or minimizing these social 
costs was a primary goal of the FHA. As Whitney Young, Executive 
Director of the National Urban League, eloquently stated during the 
Committee hearings, “access to decent housing is the vortex around 
which .	.	. other vital rights resolve [sic] .	.	.	. Ghetto housing isolates 
racial minorities from the public life of the community in which they 
live. It means inferior public services in health, education, 
transportation and sanitation.”377 In one of the final congressional 
debates, Senator Hart implored Congress to pass the FHA to “reduce 
crime, .	.	. upgrade the Nation’s education level, .	.	.	[and] reduce the 
welfare rolls .	.	.	.”378 
Thus, Congress considered the social costs of slums to be a key 
risk posed by housing discrimination. The FHA was intended to 
address this risk—the legislature expected that prohibiting 
discrimination would enable the dissolution of the slums, which would 
 
about how the “systemic denial of equal housing opportunity” to African Americans has 
caused overcrowding). 
 374. See 113 CONG. REC. 22,848 (1967) (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong) (“The housing 
conditions in which many of our Negro citizens are forced to live are generally of inferior 
quality .	.	.	.”). 
 375. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF 
STUDIES THAT PROVIDE QUANTITATIVE FIGURES WHICH INDICATE THAT THE 
HOUSING DOLLAR OF THE NONWHITE BUYS LESS THAN THE HOUSING DOLLAR OF A 
WHITE (1959), as reprinted in Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 42, 45. 
 376. 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale). 
 377. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 497 (prepared statement of Whitney 
M. Young, Jr., Executive Director, National Urban League). 
 378. 113 CONG. REC. 22,846 (1967) (statement of Sen. Philip Hart). Responding to the 
question of whether the FHA would have any impact on jobs and education absent 
economic legislation, Q.V. Williamson, President of the National Association of Real 
Estate Brokers testified, “Education will not be straightened until we straighten housing. 
Jobs will not be straightened until we straighten housing.” Fair Housing Act Hearings, 
supra note 319, at 187 (statement of Q.V. Williamson, President, National Association of 
Real Estate Broker’s, Inc.). 
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thereby reduce or eliminate the negative social conditions they 
imposed. 
D. Scope of the Risks: External Economic Costs 
Finally, the legislative history reveals that Congress was acutely 
aware that the urban slums created by housing discrimination had 
negative financial impacts on cities. Witnesses at the Committee 
hearings testified expressly to the financial squeezing of cities brought 
about by racial discrimination. On one end, discrimination imposed a 
financial burden on cities by driving up municipal costs for health, 
education, welfare, and police.379 Witnesses at the Committee 
hearings articulated the causal chain: discrimination creates slums, 
which in turn “breed many hazards such as depressed health 
conditions and lack of adequate health facilities, juvenile delinquency, 
soaring crime rates, fire losses, and other evils .	.	.	. These conditions 
increase the cost of municipal services .	.	.	.”380 Slums, in short, were 
expensive for cities. As Algernon Black eloquently stated on behalf 
of the ACLU, “We damage people and then we have to pay a burden 
which the larger community must bear.”381 
On the other end, Congress understood that discrimination 
negatively impacted city revenues by weakening the tax base of 
cities.382 Committee witnesses and legislators discussed two distinct 
mechanisms by which discrimination diminished municipal tax 
revenues. First, legalized discrimination encouraged the mortgage 
industry to engage in unscrupulous practices such as blockbusting and 
panic selling.383 These practices introduced volatility into the real 
estate market and drove down property values.384 Witnesses testified 
 
 379. Id. at 180 (prepared statement of Algernon D. Black, on behalf of the ACLU) 
(“The money cost [of segregation] is high; the financial cost of extra services for health, 
education, welfare, and police. We damage people and then we have to pay a burden 
which the larger community must bear.”). 
 380. Id. at 105 (statement of Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and 
Chairman, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights). 
 381. Id. at 180 (prepared statement of Algernon D. Black, on behalf of the ACLU). 
 382. Id. at 105 (statement of Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and 
Chairman, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights) (“These conditions increase the cost of 
municipal services while at the same time decreasing the tax base from which the cost of 
the services is raised.”). 
 383. Id. at 21 (statement of Ramsey Clark, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (describing 
the practice of racial blockbusting). 
 384. Letter from William L. Taylor, Staff Director, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights Tech. 
Info. Ctr., to Senator Walter F. Mondale, reprinted in Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra 
note 319, at 86, 88 (noting that blockbusting creates a fear that property values in a given 
neighborhood will depreciate by an influx of minorities, which “become self-fulfilling 
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that fair housing laws, by contrast, had been shown to have a 
stabilizing effect on property values by eliminating these practices.385 
Second, the racialized ghettoization of cities weakened the tax base. 
Numerous statements in the Committee hearings described how, by 
bringing about urban decay, legalized discrimination resulted in 
weakened tax bases because property values decreased and wealthier 
residents fled to the suburbs.386 
The financial situation of cities was described as untenable and 
demanding of government action.387 Senator Hugh Scott bemoaned 
that discrimination in the housing market leads to social conditions 
that cause 
the loss of property values which erode the property which so 
many people rise so strongly to protect. The rich, the well-
favored, the middle-income group, all of those people who 
would like to see their property maintain or increase its value 
will have to stand by unless something constructive is done at 
the National, State, and local levels. It is said that people find 
their property values are decreasing.388 
 
prophecies” and that “[t]he fear produces panic-selling, which in turn results in the very 
depreciation in the housing market and chaos in the community that is feared”). 
 385. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 404 (statement of Elliot N. Couden, 
Rep., Seattle Real Estate Board). The record of the Committee hearings also cited data 
showing that integration tended to increase property values. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS TECH. INFO. CTR., SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON PROPERTY VALUES AND 
RACE (1967), as reprinted in Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 88–89; Fair 
Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 386 (statement of George Meany, President, 
AFL-CIO). 
 386. See Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 105 (statement of Roy Wilkins, 
Executive Director, NAACP, and Chairman, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights) 
(“The crowding and increased deterioration of the inner cities foster new slums and slum 
conditions .	.	.	. These conditions .	.	. decreas[e] the tax base .	.	.	.”); id. at 375 (statement of 
James W. Cook, President, Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, 
Chicago) (“Accommodating our Negro population by expanding the ghetto is also 
prohibitively expensive. It erodes the tax base for real property, and increases the cost of 
essential goods and services for the rest of us.”). A pamphlet by the National Committee 
Against Discrimination in Housing, introduced into the Committee Record, stated that in 
order to understand the evils of housing segregation, one must only “[w]itness the 
deterioration and decay of the nation’s cities, with their shrinking tax bases and expanding 
costs for essential services.” NAT’L COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUS., supra 
note 364, as reprinted in Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 286. 
 387. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 181 (prepared statement of 
Algernon D. Black, on behalf of the ACLU) (“For what is to happen to the city which has 
been deserted by whites and whose government and future is thus handed over to the very 
people who have been deprived? The vast majority of the American people recognize that 
we cannot go on as we have in the past.”). 
 388. 113 CONG. REC. 22,846 (1967) (statement of Sen. Hugh Scott). 
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Attorney General Clark likewise testified to the financial strain 
segregation imposes on cities: “Difficulty in supplying the needs of 
the city in police protection and crime control, in education, 
employment, health, beauty, and recreation, and the many essential 
private and public services, is compounded many times over by 
segregation.”389 Senators also invoked a study conducted by the 
Council of Economic Advisors, which estimated that the total 
economic cost of racial discrimination was $27 billion.390 In sum, “in 
the very cities where [social services] costs are greater the tax base in 
property and the ability to pay income taxes is undermined by the 
very ills brought by the discriminatory practices.”391 
 Thus, the economic costs of discrimination, particularly those 
borne by cities, were another key risk that Congress intended to 
address. 
E. Scope of Liability 
Under the scope of liability framework, the outcome of the scope 
of the risk test dictates the statute’s proximate cause standard. 
Specifically, liability is limited to the harms that fall within the scope 
of the risks that the statute was enacted to prevent or minimize. The 
application of the scope of the risk test reveals three key categories of 
risk from housing discrimination that motivated the passage of the 
FHA: individual psychological and economic harms, residential 
segregation, and urban decay, with its associated social and economic 
impacts. The legislative history indicates that Congress understood 
these harms as an interrelated web of consequences and recognized 
the all but inevitable results of discriminatory conduct in the housing 
market. Thus, under the scope of liability framework, proximate 
cause is satisfied where the harm caused by unlawful discrimination 
operates through direct effects on the housing market and falls within 
one or more of the three categories discussed in Sections V.B–D. 
The Supreme Court was indeed correct that “[n]othing in the 
[FHA] suggests that Congress intended to provide a remedy wherever 
 
 389. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 4 (statement of Ramsey Clark, 
Att’y Gen. of the United States). Attorney General Clark also noted that housing 
discrimination “restricts the number of new homes which are built and consequently 
reduces the amount of building materials and residential financing which moves across 
state lines.” FEDERAL HOUSING LEGISLATION, supra note 369, in Fair Housing Act 
Hearings, supra note 319, at 14. 
 390. 113 CONG. REC. 22,848 (1967) (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong). 
 391. Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 319, at 180 (prepared statement of 
Algernon D. Black, on behalf of the ACLU). 
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[the] ripples of harm travel.”392 However, the legislative history offers 
clear insight on which “ripples of harm” Congress intended to be 
recoverable. Congress enacted the FHA with the goals of eliminating 
or minimizing the categories of injuries discussed above, at least to 
the extent those consequences are brought about by discrimination in 
the housing market. It is quite possible to imagine a different result of 
course. Had Congress been solely concerned with the unfairness of 
discrimination to minority individuals or the economic limitations 
individuals encountered when they faced unequal access to housing—
in other words, had Congress’s concerns been limited to those 
described in Section V.A—the scope of liability would not extend 
nearly so far. But Congress had broad social and economic ambitions 
when it enacted the FHA. It understood discrimination to cause 
residential segregation and urban decay, in turn, socially and 
economically impacting urban communities. Congress passed the 
FHA to negate those effects. Thus, where conduct in violation of the 
FHA caused the exact outcomes that the drafters knew it to cause 
and intended to prevent, the scope of liability framework recognizes 
that liability should so extend. Such is the essence of the framework. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article responds to the question explicitly left open by the 
Supreme Court in Bank of America: what is the meaning of 
proximate cause under the FHA? It contextualizes this question 
within the Court’s growing body of statutory proximate cause 
doctrine. Over the past decade and a half, the Court has imported 
proximate cause requirements into statutes with increasing frequency. 
This Article shows that despite this trend, the Court has not yet 
developed clear principles to determine the meaning of proximate 
cause in a given statutory context. To the contrary, the doctrine the 
Court has created is rife with inconsistencies and lacks any degree of 
internal coherence. Bank of America both reflects and solidifies this 
incoherence. 
This Article has leveraged these insights as a springboard to 
confront the question of how to determine the meaning of proximate 
cause in all statutory claims. It has systematically unpacked the 
doctrinal incoherence and has located its source in the Court’s 
shifting analytical frameworks. The Article has synthesized these 
 
 392. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) (quoting 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 534 (1983)). 
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frameworks into three categories: common law, public policy, and 
legislative intent. The Article has demonstrated that the Court’s 
fluctuation among these three frameworks has allowed it to articulate 
conflicting proximate cause standards that are doctrinally 
unjustifiable. 
To resolve this incoherence, the Article contends that the Court 
must adopt a consistent analytical framework to determine the 
meaning of proximate cause under statutory causes of action. The 
Article has proposed that the Court uniformly apply the scope of 
liability framework, as set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. It 
argues that this framework properly anchors the proximate cause 
analysis in the statutory scheme, promotes doctrinal determinacy, and 
avoids improper judicial legislation. The last part of this Article then 
returned to the context of Bank of America and applied the proposed 
framework to the FHA. Through extensive legislative history 
analysis, the Article showed that proximate cause under the FHA is 
satisfied where a violation of the statute causes harm, through direct 
effects on the housing market, falling within any of three categories: 
individualized psychological and economic harms, residential 
segregation, and the social and economic costs of urban decay. The 
harms alleged by the City in Bank of America fall squarely within this 
third category, and thus proximate cause is satisfied. 
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